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RISKING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:
ARBITRARINESS, JURIES, AND
DISCRETION IN CAPITAL CASES
JANET C. HOEFFEL*
Abstract: This Article argues that the stalled dialogue over the U.S.
Supreme Court's administration of capital punishment suffers from a
fundamental misunderstanding of the first principles of the Eighth
Amendment, Although the Court in Furman v. Georgia articulated an
Eighth Amendment substantive right against the arbitrary imposition of
death sentences, the Court later recast Furman to require procedures
that merely reduced a substantial risk of arbitrariness. Instead, Furman
mandates procedures that expose arbitrariness. The best vehicle for this
is a review of jurors' reasons for , imposing death in an individual case.
Although there are political and practical hurdles to mining the jurors'
reasons for imposing death, they are far from insurmountable. Absent a
moratorium, this Article advocates change that informs and exposes the
process of death.
As to impossibility, all I can say is that nothing is more true of [the legal)
profession than that the most eminent among them, for 100 years, have
testified with complete confidence that something is impossible which, once it
is introduced, is found to be very easy of administration.
—F. Frankfurter'
INTRODUCTION
We are at an impasse in the dialogue on the jurisprudence of
capital punishment. In order to move forward, both proponents and
opponents need to revisit the basic Eighth Amendment principle
* ©2005, Janet C. Hoeffel, Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School; J.D., Stan-
ford Law School. I wish to thank Robert Weisberg, Victor Streib, Lloyd Bonfield, Michael
Collins, Pamela Metzger, Felice Batlan, and Steve Singer for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this article. I am grateful to my research assistants Scutt Sherman, Rebekah
Page, Jason Totoiu, and Andrew Cantor for their hard work. I also thank Dean Lawrence
Ponoroff for the generous research grants that made this Article possible.
I Felix Frankfurter, The Problem of Capital Punishment, in OF LAW AND MEN 77, 86
(Philip Elman ed., 1956), quoted in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 287 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. Both sides mis-
takenly assume that there is no alternative to the U.S. Supreme
Court's current interpretation of its Eighth Amendment role as one
of risk management.
In 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that proce-
dures that substantially reduce the risk of arbitrariness in the imposi-
tion of the death penalty satisfy the Eighth Amendment.2 After insti-
tuting this risk-management system, we have never looked back,
Looking back, however, both reveals the fundamental unacceptability
of this system and suggests the alternative.
The Eighth Amendment command the Court purported to be
fulfilling in Gregg came from Furman v. Georgia, decided four years ear-
lier, 3
 Furman stood for the simple proposition that arbitrary imposi-
tion of death violated the Eighth Amendment. 4 That substantive
Eighth Amendment mandate against arbitrary decision making can-
not be met by policing procedures that merely reduce the risk of arbi-
trariness. Under such a system, arbitrary decision making is toler-
ated. 5
One of the likely reasons the Court adopted risk-reduction pro-
cedures in Gregg is that the alternative—risk exposure—was unthink-
able. To take Furman at face value is to require a searching review of
direct evidence of arbitrariness, and direct evidence can only come
from the jurors themselves. The jury, however, is ostensibly guarded
by a wall of secrecy. It is well past time to scrutinize the propriety of
jury secrecy in capital cases, 6 Study of the concerns about revealing
jurors' thought processes uncovers, at bottom, the unspoken fear that
revelation will expose arbitrariness. The demands of the Eighth
Amendment require this exposure.
This Article breaks the impasse in the dialogue about capital pun-
ishment by changing the conversation from one about the adequacies
of procedures used to reduce the risk of arbitrariness to one about
the best procedures to expose arbitrariness. The imperfection in a
2 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, jj.); see also id. at
188 ("Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman [v. Georgia] held that it
could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it
would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner?).
3 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
4 See infra notes 13-33 and accompanying text.
5 The evidence that we do have shows that arbitrary decision making does exist. See in-
fra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
6 The term 'jury secrecy" in this Article refers to all procedures attendant to the non-
disclosure of jury deliberations, both during trial and post-trial.
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system that allows a risk of arbitrary imposition of death has been
common ground between both proponents and opponents. The im-
perfection is either accepted as inevitable or rejected as inevitable.
This proposal is targeted at the imperfection and the inevitability.
The Eighth Amendment proscription against arbitrary decision
making can draw its meaning from a comparison to administrative
law. Agency decisions are reviewed for arbitrariness as a matter of
course, and the making of a record of the decisionmaker's reasons is
crucial to a searching review. In capital cases, the Supreme Court has
openly struggled with the lack of a record in weighing the effects of
error on the jury's sentencing decision. The Court's majority and dis-
senting opinions guess at whether the jurors thought about imposing
the death penalty in a way that would have made their decision arbi-
trary. The Eighth Amendment mandate requires a procedure for un-
covering, to the best possible degree, the jurors' true reasons for their
decision to impose death.
Part I of this Article demonstrates that, in Furman v. Georgia, the
Court set forth the Eighth Amendment command as a substantive
right against arbitrary imposition of death, but that, four years later in
Gregg v. Georgia, the Court stepped back by declaring that Furman re-
quires procedures that only reduce a substantial risk of arbitrariness.?
Part II then demonstrates how the standard critique of the Court's
administration of the death penalty, while helpful in its own right, has
lost the true meaning of Furman and therefore lost the opportunity to
move us forward. 8 Part III discusses the content of arbitrary decision
making in capital cases and establishes the need for a record of the
jurors' reasons in order to expose this arbitrariness, Part IV then
studies the barriers to reviewing jury decision making. Enforcement
of procedures supporting the tradition proves to be spotty and incon-
sistent, and the rationales underlying jury secrecy are surprisingly in-
substantial when weighed against the Eighth Amendment mandate."
Finally, Part V proposes mechanisms through which jurors' reasons
for imposing death may be reviewed. After discussing alternatives, this
Article endorses post-trial interviews of jurors as the most reliable
method for gathering evidence of arbitrariness. 11
7 See infra notes 13-48 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 49-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 87-129 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 130-214 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 215-34 and accompanying text.
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Although it may be that the best way to eliminate arbitrariness in
capital cases is to suspend the death penalty, in the meantime, juries
continue to sentence people to death. It is thirty years past time to
review the process for imposing death: "'If we would guide by the
light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.'"t 2
I. FURMAN AS SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT, GREGG AS PROCEDURAL WRONG
The Supreme Court's shift in emphasis from Furman v. Georgia to
Gregg v. Georgia four years later was an unfortunate, but foreseeable,
concession to practicalities." If the Court interpreted Furman as it
should have—as holding that the Eighth Amendment absolutely pro-
hibited the arbitrary imposition of death—then how would there ever
be proof of an arbitrary decision? It would be virtually impossible to
prove that a jury acted arbitrarily because there is no record of why a
jury decides to impose death. This raises the question asked in this
Article: must that be so? Without asking that question, or deftly side-
stepping it, judges and commentators have succumbed to the belief
that, while not ideal, the most that could be done is to establish pro-
cedures that reduce the risk of an arbitrary result.
The starting premise is that Furman did in fact hold that the
Eighth Amendment prohibited arbitrary imposition of death. At over
230 pages, the longest opinion ever written by the Court, with nine
separate opinions, Furman can too easily be dispensed with as stand-
ing for no more than the narrow proposition in the per curiam opin-
ion. The one-paragraph opinion held simply that "the imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in these [three] cases constitute
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Four-
teenth Arnendments." 4
 However, a unifying principle of Furman can
be loosely ascertained from the separately written opinions of the
concurring Justices. The core commonality of the concurring opin-
12
 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 312 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
"Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, k):
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
14
 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam). The original ambition of some members of the
Court was to decide whether the death penalty was "cruel and unusual punishment[]"
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, an issue the Court had avoided until Furman. Sec
William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the
Court, 100 14ARv. L. REV. 313, 321 (1986) ("We were clearly itching toward resolving [the
issue.'"). As Justice Brennan recalled fourteen years after Furman, it was "clear that the
difficult issue for everyone was how the Court could responsibly interpret the broadly
worded prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" Id. at 322-23.
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ions15 was the underlying concern that the jurors had made their de-
cisions to impose death arbitrarily. 16
Justice Stewart's short nine-paragraph concurring opinion is
most often cited for the meaning of Furman.° Justice Stewart rea-
soned that because the death penalty was imposed so infrequently, the
choice to do so in those few cases and not others was "cruel and un-
usual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and un-
usual." 18 Petitioners were among "a capriciously selected random
handful" who were chosen to die. 19 Justice Stewart went no further
than to "simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under le-
gal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and
freakishly imposed."2°
For Justice White, as for Justice Stewart, infrequency of imposi-
tion was the core problem. The infrequency meant that the death
penalty could not be justified under societal goals of retribution or
deterrence and therefore violated the Eighth Amendruent. 21 The in-
frequency of the imposition of death for even "the most atrocious
crimes" meant "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." 22
15 Here, '`the concurring opinions" refers to those of Justices Stewart, White, and
Douglas, who found the operation of the death penalty unconstitutional in these cases.
Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in the result but concluded that the death pen-
alty per se violated the prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments." See 408 U.S.
at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
16 Cf. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305,317 ("In the manner
of literary criticism, one can extract unifying 'themes' in the Furman opinions, such as the
dangers of arbitrariness and discrimination .... But ... there really is no doctrinal hold-
ing in Furman . . . .").
17 408 U.S. at 306-14 (Stewart, J., concurring). This is likely because Justice Stewart's
opinion, short and concise, represented the least common denominator among the con-
curring opinions, and he was the only member of the Court in the majority in both Furman
and Gregg, and wrote the plurality judgment opinion in Gregg, which purported to inter-
pret Furman. See id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
16 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
19 Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart added, "My concurring
Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these
few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race, But racial
discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one side." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (citation omitted).
20 Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). Although Justice Stewart did not specifically use the
word "arbitrary," he subsequently used the word in Grey; when stating the holding of Fur-
man. See id. (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (opinion of Stewart, J.)
(using the words "arbitrary and capricious").
21 Furman, 408 U.S. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring).
22 Id. at 313 (Whited., concurring).
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At bottom, Justice White's concern was that the jury was arbitrarily
withholding the death penalty. 23
Justice Douglas's conclusion was that the death penalty statutes at
issue, which gave jurors complete discretion to decide between life or
death, allowed prejudice and discrimination to operate, and "dis-
crimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal
protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and un-
usual' punishments."24 Because "[p]eople live or die, dependent on
the whim of one man or of 12,"2s a man may well be put to death "if
he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a mem-
ber of a suspect or unpopular minority."26 Justice Douglas's focus on
an equal protection theme he found implicit in the Eighth Amend-
ment was simply another form of the principle that "` [a] penalty ...
should be considered 'unusually' imposed if it is administered arbi-
trarily or discriminatorily."'27
Furman can most simply and directly be said to have held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits arbitrary imposition of the death pen-
alty. 28 Seen in this irreducible, straightforward manner, Furman joined
a line of rare but venerable cases, from Weems v. United States 29 to Trop
23 See id. (White, J., concurring). Although it seems that Justice White was focused on
the arbitrary exercise of mercy, the arbitrary imposition of death is a necessary corollary.
See id. (White, J., concurring).
24 Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
5 Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
27 Id. at 249 (quoting Arthur Goldberg 8c Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Pen-
alty Unconstitutiona4 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1790 ( 1970)).
25 Besides the three concurring justices, Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Burger also
identified arbitrariness as the majority's core concern. See id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("[T]he conclusion is virtually inescapable that [the death penalty] is being inflicted
arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system."); id. at 398-99 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("The decisive grievance of the opinions .. is that the present system of
discretionary sentencing in capital cases has failed to produce evenhanded justice; the
problem is not that too few have been sentenced to die, but that the selection process has
followed no rational pattern. This claim of arbitrariness is not only lacking in empirical
support, but also it manifestly fails to establish that the death penalty is a 'cruel and un-
usual' punishment."). In addition, on occasion, members of the Court have recited the
Furman mandate in a manner consistent with an absolute prohibition on arbitrary imposi-
tion of death. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 782 (1990) (mentioning the importance of
"safeguarding the Eighth Amendment's bedrock guarantee against the arbitrary or capri-
cious imposition of the death penalty"); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990) (citing
the "longstanding recognition that, above all, capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate,
and nonarbitrary").
29 217 U.S. 349, 381-82 (1910) (holding sentence of twelve years in chains at hard la-
bor cruel and unusual).
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v. Dulles" to Robinson v. California," which defined the substance of
"cruel and unusual punishments" as encompassing more than acts of
brutality and torture. 32 The Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and
unusual punishments" also prohibited punishment imposed unneces-
sarily, disproportionately, excessively, and now, after Furman, death
imposed arbitrarily.33
This was not how Justice Stewart saw Furman four years later in
Gregg v. Georgia.34 Rather, Justice Stewart, writing an opinion and issu-
ing the plurality judgment of the Court, stated, "Because of the
uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be im-
posed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it
would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." 35 Crucially,
Furman's holding also became the affirmative version of Justice Stew-
art's rephrasing: the death penalty could be imposed under sentencing
procedures that allowed for a risk, albeit something less than "sub-
stantial," that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner. 36 Gregg, through its reincarnation of Furman., then, could
claim, "Furman mandates ... that discretion [in a capital case] must
be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbi-
trary and capricious action."37 With these words, a system of risk-
management was born.
Yet, neither "sentencing procedures" nor "risks" had been a part
of Furman's mandate. The concurring Justices in Furman. had
identified the results, and not the presence or absence of procedures,
3° 356 U.S. 86, 99-103 (1958) (holding' expatriation cruel and unusual).
31 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding imprisonment for narcotics addiction cruel and
unusual).
32 See Weems, 217 U.S. at 372 ("[S]urely [the Framers] intended more than to register a
fear of the forms of abuse that went out of practice with the Stuarts.").
33 At least one scholar has suggested that a prohibition against arbitrary infliction of a
severe punishment was inherent in the history of the Cruel and Unusual Clause. See An-
thony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57
CAL. L. REV. 839, 857-60 (1969).
34 428 U.S. at 188 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,1].).
33 Id. (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (emphasis added).
36 See id. (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, jj.).
37 Id. at 189 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, .11.) (emphasis added). This
"wholly arbitrary and capricious" phrasing became a favorite of the Court's. See Arave v.
Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 470 (1993) (quoting phrase); Lewis, 497 U.S. at 774 (same); Barclay
v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983) (same); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983)
(same). Justice Marshall took issue with the use of "wholly" in Barclay: "This implies that in
death cases there are degrees of acceptable arbitrariness and that there exists some
undefined point at which a sentence crosses over into the nether world of 'wholly' arbi-
trary decisionmaking." 463 U.S. at 987 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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as the primary evil. Justices Stewart and White had not even men-
tioned procedures—neither those procedures in place nor those that
might be required. 38
 And no concurring Justice had settled merely for
eliminating a "risk," because they each had simply assumed that arbi-
trary imposition had, in fact, occurred. 39
 Although one might argue
that procedures to manage risk were what the concurring Justices had
in mind, that was not what they said.
In characterizing the holding of Furman in Gregg Justice Stewart
was faced with two realities. First, if he recognized Furman as outlaw-
ing arbitrary imposition of death, then any statutory scheme ap-
proved would have to provide a means for empirical proof of arbi-
trariness. 40
 That was a subject that had not been broached; even the
concurring Justices in Furman conceded that they were proceeding
under an assumption of arbitrariness rather than an empirical foun-
dation. The only method for providing an empirical foundation
m
 In addition, Justice Douglas essentially challenges the states to resolve his social and
political discomfort over the products of the death penalty." Weisberg, supra note 16, at 316
(emphasis added).
59
 Because Justice Stewart in Furman had no actual proof of why the jurors had de-
cided to impose the penalty in the very few cases in which they had done so, he used the
infrequency as a proxy for proof. See 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White
explicitly admitted his lack of proof and relied upon his own personal experience to tell
him that jurors were acting arbitrarily. See id. at 313 (Mite, J., concurring) ("I need not
restate the facts and figures that appear in the opinions of my Brethren. Nor can I 'prove'
my conclusion from these data. But, like my Brethren, I must arrive at judgment; and I can
do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts
and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving
crimes for which death is the authorized penalty."). Justice Douglas did amass some proof
that jurors acted with discrimination. Id. at 249-52 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing study
of capital cases in Texas and comments of former warden of Sing Sing Prison and former
Attorney General Ramsey Clark).
40
 In a Note published in the Harvard Law Review after Furman and before Gregg, the
author suggested that the Court could not interpret Furman as an "arbitrariness-in-fact"
test because doing so would require an empirical foundation, which concededly the con-
curringiustices did not have. Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty
Statutes, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1690,1694 (1974). To interpret Furman instead as condemning
unfettered discretion in capital sentencing schemes
would justify the Court's having acted in Furman and companion cases with-
out any sound empirical foundation, and would avoid the need for judicial
speculation about how statutes will be administered. Moreover, .. requiring
the state to restrict discretion may be the only feasible method to assure re-
duction of the arbitrariness which three of the concurring Justices found pro-
scribed by the eighth amendment. Such a requirement would also limit
official complicity in whatever arbitrariness is not eliminated.
Id. at 1695-96.
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would be to pierce the veil of jury secrecy, and that suggestion was,
perhaps, unimaginable.
The second practical reality was that the states had responded to
Furman with overwhelming support for capital punishment. 41 Anxious
to meet the demand of their constituents, the state legislatures
adopted the most expedient mechanism at their disposal. Guided dis-
cretion statutes had already been contemplated and discussed. In
1959, the American Law Institute suggested a version of such a statute
in the Model Penal Code. The Code provided a list of aggravating cir-
cumstances and a list of mitigating circumstances that the sentencer
could consider, none of which were exclusive, and instructed that the
penalty of death should not be imposed unless the sentencer found
that one of the enumerated aggravating circumstances existed and
there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for mercy. 42 Guided discretion statutes such as this were already in cir-
culation when the Court decided Furman.
Given the lack of perceived alternatives to guided discretion stat-
utes, Justice Stewart accepted guided discretion as the answer to Fur-
man.43 In order to hold that guided discretion statutes complied with
Furman, Justice Stewart had to find that Furman commanded only risk-
managing procedures. Guided discretion statutes allow ample room
for arbitrary decision making. In fact, six members of the Court said
as much one year before Furman, Justice Harlan, writing for the Court
in McGautha v. California," considered and rejected the Model Penal
Code's suggested guidelines. In holding that unfettered discretion to
impose death was not unconstitutional, he argued that the expression
of standards was useless to guard against the supposed evils of discre-
4i In the year following Furman, more than half the state legislatures nationwide intro-
duced bills to restore capital punishment. See CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 148 (Bryan Vila & Cynthia Morris, eds., 1997). Within
two years of Furman, over half of the states had passed new death penalty legislation. See
Note, supra note 40, at 1691 & n.6 (citing statutes), Public support for the death penalty
increased after Furman, from 53% in 1972, to 60% in 1976. Samuel R. Gross, Still Unfair,
Still Arbitrary—But Do We Care?, 26 Otuo N.U. L. REV. 517,521 (2000).
42 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, app. at 222-25 (1971) (reprinting 1962
Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal Code).
43 The seeds of Gregg's solution of guided discretion were sewn both in McGauthe and
in Chief justice Burger's dissent in Furman. Chief Justice Burger's dissent essentially gave
the states their marching orders: he offered that the concurring Justices' concern about
arbitrary punishment could be met by providing standards for juries and judges to follow
in determining the sentence in capital cases or by more narrowly defining the crimes for
which the penalty is to be imposed." 408 U.S. at 400 (Burger, C.f., dissenting).
44 402 U.S. at 207.
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tionless sentencing: "[SJ uch criteria do not purport to provide more
than the most minimal control over the sentencing authority's exer-
cise of discretion [a]nd, of course, they provide no protection
against the jury determined to decide on whimsy or caprice." 45
With a flourish of the pen, guided discretion statutes were im-
ported into the substance of the Eighth Amendment. The transforma-
tion of Furman's substantive mandate into a procedural due process
demand for "guided discretion" was complete. 46 The only matter left
to the courts was to monitor the level of risk tolerable under the Con-
stitution.47 So began the states' and the Court's long and lumbering
engagement with guided discretion statutes and the problems fore-
shadowed by Justice Harlan. The standard critique has correctly de-
cried this ill-fated engagement. 48 However, if Furman really meant
what it said, then the critique should have gone much further.
H. THE DEAD ENDS OF THE STANDARD CRITIQUE
The limitation of the standard critique of the Court's administra-
tion of the death penalty lies in the fact that it does not question Gregg
v. Georgia's retooling of Furman v. Georgia from an opinion intolerant
of arbitrariness to one tolerant of a risk. 49 Rather, the critique focuses
on the fact that the Court's administration of this risk-management
system has failed. This is valid criticism in its own right, but it can only
lead to dead ends.5° The criticism has lead to one of two places: a call
for either the end of the system or a better risk-management system.
45 Id. Justice Harlan's critique of those guidelines would be echoed again and again
over the next thirty years. Robert Weisberg wrote that Justice Harlan's statement in
McGautha "was the Court's (soon unheeded) warning to itself that the entire enterprise of
subjecting capital punishment to legal rules was hopeless and unnecessary." Weisberg,
supra note 16, at 308.
48 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 399 (Burger, Cj., dissenting) (arguing that the concurring
opinions called for guided discretion, which was "essentially and exclusively a procedural
due process argument").
47 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n.8 (1986) ("III he only question is at what
point that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable.").
48 See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("[T]he Court has chosen to deregulate the entire enterprise, replac-
ing, it would seem, substantive constitutional requirements with mere aesthetics").
49 See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and
Stevens,lf.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
5° See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("[T] he death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident
to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.").
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The former will not be compelled any time soon, and the latter unfor-
tunately continues to accept risk management over risk elimination.
The conventional critique describes two problems in the risk-
management scheme. First, the Court has not demanded much
"guidance" in guided discretion, therefore establishing the level of
risk unacceptably high. Second, the principles behind guided discre-
tion are in tension with a separate Eighth Amendment principle of
individuality, which calls for the unlimited discretion of the jury to
consider mitigating evidence on behalf of the defendant. However, if
Furman is viewed as a substantive command against arbitrary imposi-
tions of death, the lack of guidance problem, while real, misses the
mark, and the dueling principles problem is nonexistent.
A. The Lack of Guidance Problem
Critics have ably demonstrated that the Supreme Court essen-
tially abandoned a regime of meaningful guidance. Two decades ago,
Robert Weisberg wrote that "the Court has reduced the law of the
penalty trial to almost a bare aesthetic exhortation that the states just
do something—anything—to give the penalty trial a legal appear-
ance."" The Court has approved statutory schemes that do no more
than simply narrow the class of offenders eligible for the death pen-
alty, allowing unguided discretion to reign at that point. 52 The Court
51 Weisberg, supra note 16, at 306.
52 In Zant v. Stephens, the Supreme Court affirmed Georgia's statutory scheme where
the aggravating circumstance merely performs the function of narrowing the category of
persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty." 462 U.S. 862, 875
(1983). The approved statute gave the jury 'absolute discretion" to decide whether to im-
pose life or death after finding the aggravating circumstance. Id. at 871. As Carol and Jor-
dan Steiker observed:
If we are worried that the failure to provide precise guidance to capital sen-
tencers may lead them to use irrelevant characteristics (like physical attrac-
tiveness) or impermissible ones (like race or class) to determine who should
live and who should die from among the equally eligible, this problem is not
resolved merely by narrowing the range of persons among whom the sen-
tencer can discriminate.
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Con-
stitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 382 (1995) (hereinafter
Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts) (Citing Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let
God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE
U. 835, 863 (1992) (book review) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out]);
see also Zant, 462 U.S. at 910 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If this is not a scheme based on
`standardless jury discretion,' I do not know what is. Today's decision makes an absolute
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has also upheld vague aggravating factors" and eliminated mandatory
proportionality review of sentences, 54
 further diminishing protection
against arbitrary decision making.
Critics' suggestions for remedying these problems, however, are
unsatisfactory. Some have suggested reworking those same proce-
dures,55
 but guided discretion procedures, no matter how refined,
entertain very real risks of arbitrary decisions to impose death. Others
have ultimately concluded that it is impossible to guide the inevitably
discretionary decision whether to impose death, 56
 and instead focus
mockery of this Court's precedents concerning capital sentencing procedures.") (quoting
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.47 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,B.)).
55 See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 978 (1994) (approving "circumstances
of the crime" as an aggravating circumstance in California); Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463,
471-72 (1993) (upholding Idaho's "utter disregard for human life" circumstance with the
interpretation that the defendant be a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer"); Walton v. Arizona,
497 U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990) (upholding Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel or depraved"
circumstance as defined by the Arizona Supreme Court as when the perpetrator "'relishes
the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion,' or 'shows an indifference to the suffer-
ing of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure' in the killing"); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976) (upholding the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" circum-
stance on Florida's restriction to include only "'the conscienceless or pitiless crime which
is unnecessarily torturous to the victim'"). Justice Blackmun's dissents in Walton v. Arizona
and Tuilaepa v. California roundly criticized the Court's conclusions that there were any
limiting circumstances at all to these factors, in principle or in practice. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S.
at 984-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Walton, 497 U.S. at 692-99 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
see also Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases—
The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941, 942 (1986) (conducting state-by-state analy-
sis of appellate decisions and concluding that their inconsistent and overbroad application
of the "especially heinous" circumstance does not guide discretion); Steiker & Steiker,
Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 52, at 373-74 (arguing that approval of vague aggravating
circumstances and lack of limits on the number of aggravating factors does not narrow the
choice of who dies).
54
 Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984). In dissent in Pulley, Justice Brennan
voiced his dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs:
The results obtained by many States that undertake such proportionality re-
view, pursuant to either state statute or judicial decision, convince me that
this form of appellate review serves to eliminate some, if only a small part, of
the irrationality that infects the current imposition of death sentences
throughout the various States.
Id. at 67-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et at, Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A
Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13-14, 68 (1980) (arguing for more rigorous
appellate proportionality review); Vivian Berger, "Black Box Decisions" on Life or Death—If
They're Arbitrary, Don't Blame the fury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. RES.
L. Rev. 1067, 1069, 1086-88 (1991) (suggesting better jury instructions and elimination of
vague aggravating circumstances).
56 See Callins, 510 U.S. at 1153 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (ar-
guing that "the decision whether a human being should live or die is so inherently subjec-
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on points in the system other than the decision-making process. 57 To
avoid a hard look at the jury's decision, however, is to escape Furman's
constitutional mandate. As long as there is discretion, there is the pos-
sibility of prejudice, mistake, and caprice. And as long as there is
prejudice, mistake, and caprice, it is the constitutional obligation of
the courts to expose it, not avoid it.
Members of the Court have readily acknowledged that arbitrary
imposition of death will occur within its system of managing risk.
Then Justice Rehnquist recognized the inevitability of arbitrariness in
Woodson v. North Carolina.58 In discussing the meaninglessness of a
proportionality review of a death sentence, he said:
The plurality seems to believe that provision for appellate
review will afford a check upon the instances of juror arbi-
trariness in a discretionary system. But it is not at all appar-
ent that appellate review of death sentences, through a pro-
tive—rife with all of life's understandings, experiences, prejudices, and passions—that it
inevitably defies the rationality and consistency required by the Constitution."); Patrick E.
Higginbotham, Juries and the Death Penally, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1047,1048-49 (1991)
("[T]he ultimate call is visceral. The decision must occur past the point to which legalistic
reasoning can carry; it necessarily reflects a gutlevel hunch as to what is just."); Steiker &
Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 52, at 413 ("If the capital punishment decision
can be neither 'true' nor 'false' (as facts are said to be) nor 'correct' or 'incorrect' (as
legal judgments are said to be), but instead represents an existential moment of moral
perception,' then refining the directions given to the decisionmakers (the jurors) cannot
assist, but rather will merely obscure the fundamentally moral choice that they must
make." (citations omitted)); Weisberg, supra note 16, at 393 (arguing that the ineffective
procedures built around the moment of decision "ha[vel enabled us to avoid acknowledg-
ing the inevitably unsystematic, irreducibly personal moral elements of the choice to ad-
minister the death penalty").
67 See Weisberg, supra note 16, at 359-60 (arguing that after the Court's deregulation
of the administration of capital punishment, we have to focus on other points in the sys-
tem of death penalty decisionmaking other than the moment of decision by the sen-
tencer"). The proposals include: establishing narrowing factors which effectively reduce
the kind and number of homicides for which the jury can impose death, Scott W. Howe,
The Failed Case for Eighth Amendment Regulation of the Capital-Sentencing Trial, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 795,848 (1998); Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 52 at 415-17; mak-
ing proportionality decisions to reduce further who can be considered for the death pen-
alty, Howe, supra note 52, at 848-49; Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 52,
at 417-18; mandating quality of counsel for capital defendants, Howe, supra note 52, at
856-57; Steiker Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 52, at 421-23; refining rigorous
appellate review, Weisberg, supra note 16, at 359-60; expanding post-conviction opportuni-
ties, Steiker & Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts, supra note 52, at 423-25; and scrutinizing
prosecutorial discretion, see Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty:
The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456,466-68 (1981) (focusing on prosecutorial dis-
cretion as a source of racial bias).
'8 See generally 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
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cess of comparing the facts of one case in which a death sen-
tence was imposed with the facts of another in which such a
sentence was imposed, will afford any meaningful protection
against whatever arbitrariness results from jury discretion. 59
The same can also be said of the individual "arbitrariness" review ap-
proved by the Court in Gregg. Georgia's procedure for reviewing arbi-
trariness in the jury's imposition of death involved a review of the trial
judge's answer to a questionnaire, which asked whether passion,
prejudice, bias, or any other arbitrary factor, including race,
influenced the jury's decision. 69
 It is impossible to imagine this was
anything other than a symbolic gesture. Excepting the rare occasion
where jury misconduct came to light during the trial, this was likely a
perfunctory check in the "No" column by the trial judge.
Justice Powell likewise embraced arbitrariness as inevitable in
drafting the Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp. 61 McCleskey is the
low watermark of the Court's operation of a system that monitors an
acceptable level of risk of arbitrary imposition of death. The defense
presented a statistical study showing that jurors in Georgia were mak-
ing decisions to impose death based on the defendant's and the vic-
tim's race.62
 Justice Powell, writing for a bare majority of the Court,
assumed the accuracy of the statistics but held that the study did not
show an Eighth Amendment violation. 63
 justice Powell's opinion reads
like an apology for the system. He claimed that, despite the fact that
the process "'has its weaknesses and the potential for misuse'"" and
"'there can be 'no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases gov-
59 Id. at 316 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). State proportional-
ity review has proven largely ineffective. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of
Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: Only "The Appearance offustice"?, 87 J. GRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 130, 133 (1996) (IT] he majority of state high courts reduced propor-
tionality review to a perfunctory exercise.").
ee See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 211-12 (White, J., concurring) (describing questionnaire).
Georgia still has such a form, which contains the question, "Was the jury impermissibly
influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor when imposing sentence?"
followed by the choice of checking, "Yes" or "No," and then "If the answer is yes, explain:"
followed by two and one-half lines. See Supreme Court of Georgia, Report of the Trial
Judge, http://www2.state.ga.us/Courts/Supreme/rules_UAP/uasect6.htm
 (last visited
Aug. 24, 2005).
61 See generally 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
52
 The "Baldus study" indicated that "the jury more likely than not would have spared
McCleskey's life had his victim been black" and that blacks who kill whites are sentenced to
death "at nearly 22 times the rate of blacks who kill blacks, and more than 7 times the rate of
whites who kill blacks." Id. at 325, 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
eo Id. at 308-13.
e4 Id. at 313 (quoting Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965)).
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ernmental authority should be used to impose death,'" 66 constitu-
tional guarantees are met when the sentencer's decision is "'sur-
rounded with safeguards to make it as fair as possible.'" 66 Therefore,
despite the fact that there was a high probability that the jurors in
McCleskey's case imposed death based on the arbitrary factor of race,
once the risk had been reduced as far as the Court deemed was prac-
ticable, the Eighth Amendment demand had been met. 87
To the dissent's claim that the statistics demonstrated a capital
punishment system that lacked the "uniquely high degree of rational-
ity" called for in capital cases," Justice Powell defensively retorted that
the dissent gave "no suggestion ... as to how greater 'rationality'
could be achieved under any type of statute that authorizes capital
punishment" and that the "dissent's call for greater rationality is no
less than a claim that a capital punishment system cannot be adminis-
tered in accord with the Constitution."69 Hence, the impasse in the
dialogue: either accept a certain level of risk or abandon the project."
86 Id. (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 884 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605
(1978) (plurality opinion))). "[N]o perfect procedure" became one of the Court's pet
phrases. See, e.g., Pulley, 465 U.S. at 54 (quoting phrase); 7-ant, 462 U.S. at 884 (same).
66 MeCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313 (quoting Singer; 380 U.S. at 35). Justice Blackmun would
later challenge that the majority turned its back on McCleskey's claims, apparently trou-
bled by the fact that Georgia had instituted more procedural and substantive safeguards
than most other States since Furman, but was still unable to stamp out the virus of racism."
Callins, 510 U.S. at 1154 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
67 Justice Powell concluded that the statistics, while possibly showing a likelihood that
race was a factor, did not create a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting
Georgia's capital process. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308, 313. Three years after Justice Powell
retired from the Court in 1987, he told his biographer that he would change his vote in
McCleskey and in any other capital case, including Furman, where he voted to uphold capi-
tal punishment. See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZER0'111, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 202-03 (2d. ed. 2001) (citing JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F.
POWELL, JR. 451-52 (1994)).
68 481 U.S. at 335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 313 n.37. The Court's emphasis on procedures over results is exemplified by
comparing Turner v. Murray, where the Court agreed that the risk of racial bias infecting a
capital trial was so great that jurors could be questioned about it during win dire, with
McCloskey, where the Court ignored evidence of racial bias in jurors' decisions to impose
death. See generally MeCleskey, 481 U.S. 279; Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). Discuss-
ing Turner and McCleskey, Albert Alschuler wrote, "The Court added one more gargoyle to
the front end of the temple of justice while turning its eyes from back-end outcomes. The
Court's approach appeared to be, 'Procedure yes, substance no." Albert W. Alschuler, The
Supreme Court and the Jury: 'Voir, D e, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review ofJury Verdicts, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 153, 229 (1989).
70 Steiker and Steiker note the tension between the right to jury trials and the ensuing
discretion in capital punishment cases:
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B. The Dueling Principles Problem
The second standard claim of critics of the Court's administra-
tion of the death penalty is that Furman's Eighth Amendment com-
mand, which is described as a command for standardization and con-
sistency, is in irreconcilable conflict with the Woodson/Lockett v. Ohion
Eighth Amendment command to individualize the sentencing deci-
sion to the characteristics of the individual offenders. The perception
of the tension has forced one of two decisions among some members
of the Court: Justice Scalia has chosen to abandon individualized con-
sideration,72 while Justice Blackmun chose to abandon the death pen-
alty altogether. 73 Academics who agree there is a tension either decide
the death penalty does not survive the tension 74 or simply choose to
make suggestions on points of the process other than the jury's deci-
sion Y5
However, the concept of this "tension" misperceives Furman. If
the goal of the system is an avoidance of arbitrary death in the man-
ner Furman intended, individuality enhances the goal. The principles
Given the constitutionally mandated discretion inherent in our capital pun-
ishment system, we must accept the possibility that jurors in some cases might
exercise their discretion in an arbitrary or even an unprincipled manner.
Such abuse is, and has been, one potential cost of our jury system, and a cost
that we cannot wholly eliminate without doing violence to our enduring con-
stitutional commitment to the right of trial by jury.
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Abolition in Our Time, 1 Onto ST. J. CRIM. L. 323, 328
(2003) (quoting mock decision of Court abolishing death penalty).
71 See generally Lockett, 438 U.S. 586 (plurality opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. 280.
72 Walton, 497 U.S. at 670-73 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Graham v. Collins, 506
U.S. 461, 498-500 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting limits to individuality prin-
ciple); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 321 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). (finding no constitutional re-
quirement of individuality).
73 Collins, 510 U.S. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see also
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 442 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("['The effort to
eliminate arbitrariness in the infliction of that ultimate sanction is so plainly doomed to
failure that it—and the death penalty—must be abandoned altogether.").
74 See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 67, 103 (1992)
("The Court's two objectives are not, as Justice Scalia argues, irreconcilable with each
other. Rather, they are irreconcilable with the death penalty."); Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel
Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1155
(1980) ("[I]f death as a punishment requires both maximum flexibility and nonarbitrari-
ness, and these requirements cannot both be met, . . . then death cannot be a permissible
punishment."); see also Steiker & Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out, supra note 52, at 839-41,
868 (arguing individualization has constitutional grounding but leads to arbitrariness,
meaning "Furman must be jettisoned, or Furman's failure to fulfill its promise of princi-
pled, nonarbitrary decisionmaking renders the death penalty unconstitutional").
75
 For a discussion of critics' suggestions, see supra note 57.
2005]	 Risking the Eighth Amendment	 787
only conflict if nonarbitrariness is equated with standardization,
which has as its goal ensuring consistency between punishments."
However, consistency was not, and has not been, the Court's end goal.
The underlying concern of the concurring Justices in Furman was
the jury's arbitrariness in an individual case. Certainly there were
phrases that sounded in arbitrariness between cases. Justice White said
of the death penalty, for example, that "there is no meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not,"" and ChiefJustice Burger reiterated the con-
cern of the concurring Justices as "not that too few have been sen-
tenced to die, but that the selection process has followed no rational
pattern.""
The concurring Justices, however, did not condemn simply the
inconsistent pattern of imposition of death. Rather, the inconsistent
pattern informed them that the jurors in the individual cases were
acting arbitrarily in imposing the death penalty." Since jurors sat only
in one case and were not repeat players, it could only be their lack of
reasoned judgment in the individual case that produced the irregular
pattern.so
Therefore, if arbitrariness is defined as an unprincipled or irra-
tional imposition of punishment on a particular defendant, then indi-
vidualized consideration not only does not conflict with it, but such
76 See, e.g., Howe, supra note 57, at 810-11 (equating "consistency" with "nonarbitrari-
ness" as the driving theory of the Court).
" Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, j., concurring).
78 Id. at 399 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); see also id. at 294 (Brennan, j., concurring) ("No
one has yet suggested a rational basis that could differentiate in those terms the few who
die from the many who go to prison.").
79 Justice Douglas offered that the arbitrary factors at work in individual cases were
"race, religion, wealth, social position, or class." Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice
Stewart made a nod in that direction. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("(I]f any basis
can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitu-
tionally impermissible basis of race,"),
119 The Court in Gregg also seemed to understand this individualist aspect of the mean-
ing of "arbitrary and capricious." The mandatory appellate review provided by Georgia's
death penalty statute, and given a ringing endorsement by the Court, had two parts. The
first was a proportionality review—ensuring a pattern of rationality between cases accord-
ing to the checklist. But the second was a determination "[w]hether the sentence of death
was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor,"
based partly on a six and one-half page questionnaire filled out by the trial judge that dis-
closed whether race played a role in the case. 428 U.S. at 166-67 (opinion of Stewart, Pow-
ell, and Stevens, jj.) (describing questionnaire). This was clearly a review of whether arbi-
trariness was at work in the individual case. See Jam, 462 U.S. at 890 (describing Georgia's
mandatory appellate review as designed both to "avoid arbitrariness and to assure propor-
tionality").
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consideration also enhances the "accuracy"81
 of the imposition of the
punishment.82
 Although accuracy in sentencing is a difficult concept
given the amount of discretion and subjectivity involved, more infor-
mation about the defendant and his circumstances allows a sentencer
to make a better and more informed decision as to who deserves to
die. 83
 As long as the jury uses the information in a rational, nonarbi-
trary way, then the jury is better able to function as the "conscience of
the community"84
 in deciding whether to exercise mercy in an indi-
vidual case,83
The standard critique accepts defeat too readily. It believes that
jurors' decisions to impose death are impervious to review and hence
arbitrariness is inevitable. The defeat stems from a misperception of
the constitutional mandate in death cases. The break in the impasse is
to see that Furman set the Eighth Amendment floor higher than
Gregg intolerance of arbitrariness requires a system that exposes it,
not one that hides it and guesses at its existence. Meeting Furman's
command requires embracing the moment of decision, reviewing the
jurors' reasons for imposing death, and forcing confrontation of juror
arbitrariness. 88
81 See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333,342 (1993) (IT] he Eighth Amendment requires
a greater degree of accuracy ... than would be true in a noncapital case.").
82 See Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided
Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L Rev. 1147,1175-76 (1991) (arguing the two
principles can be reconciled because both are "aimed at the same narrowing objective of
identifying, as precisely as possible, who is within the state's power to execute").
83
 Then-Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Lockett v. Ohio, was concerned that the
"more" would be "any fact, however bizarre" that the defendant wished to introduce, and
would therefore "codify and institutionalize" arbitrariness. 438 U.S. at 631 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). However, as Scott Sundby argues, there is no evidence that expanding the
amount of mitigating evidence will reduce reliability, and no proof either that litigants will
risk alienating the jury by introducing "bizarre" evidence or that jurors would react to it.
SeeSundby, supra note 82, at 1182-83.
84 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,519 (1968).
ea See also Raclin, supra note 74, at 1159 ("The substantive judgment to be made is a
moral judgment: Does this person deserve death as punishment? The requirement that
aggravating and mitigating factors be weighed is a requirement aimed at greater accuracy
in making that moral judgment. The analysis assumes that it is theoretically possible for a
person to deserve death as punishment, and that death is not morally ruled out in all
cases. The analysis focuses on the moral requirements necessary to render noncruel the
process of deciding that this person deserves death." (citation omitted)).
86
 At least one court has taken this challenge seriously. In Dobbs v. Zant, the District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia allowed a capital defendant to present juror
testimony regarding racial bias in an effort to prove an "unacceptable risk" that race af-
fected the sentencing decision. 720 F. Supp. 1566,1574-79 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
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III. DEFINING AND MAKING A RECORD OF ARBITRARINESS
There is a world of difference between procedures designed to
reduce a risk of arbitrariness and procedures designed to expose arbi-
trary decision making. In order to discover arbitrariness, we must first
define what constitutes an arbitrary imposition of death, and second,
we must recognize that a record of the decision is necessary.
A. What Is Arbitrariness in Imposing Death?
When the Court in Gregg v. Georgia chose to use the phrase "arbi-
trary and capricious" to summarize the concurrences in Furman u
Georgia, it was not a stranger to the legal meaning of the phrase in
other contexts.87 The phrase is talismanic in administrative law: An
agency rule is deemed
arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, of-
fered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise. 88
Translated into jury sentencing terms, an arbitrary and capricious de-
cision to impose death would include one where the jurors relied on
factors that jurors should not consider—such as race," an aggravating
factor subsequently invalidated by the Court," or the availability of
appellate review to correct death sentences91—or where jurors en-
tirely failed to consider an important aspect, such as mitigating evi-
dence.92 In other words, if the jury imposed death for the wrong rea-
87 Sec Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Ste-
vens,B.). Sec generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
88 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
89 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that 'unusual" pun-
ishment would include imposition of the penalty by reason of [the defendant's] race,
religion, wealth, social position, or class" or penalties "imposed under a procedure that
gives room for the play of such prejudices").
9° See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 742-43, 753-54 (1990) (describing
how jury imposed original death sentence on subsequently invalidated aggravating factor);
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 864 (1983),
in See, e.g., Caldwell v Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 332-33 (1985).
92 See, e.g., Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988).
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son, for an illegitimate reason, or for no reason at all, it would be an
arbitrary and capricious decision."
The Court has occasionally pointed out examples of what it con-
sidered arbitrary decision making in capital cases. In Mills v. Maryland
the Court found that, because of the instructions and the sentencing
form given to the jury, there was a substantial probability that the ju-
rors thought they were precluded from considering any mitigating
evidence unless they unanimously agreed on the existence of particu-
lar mitigating circumstances." Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court
that It would certainly be the height of arbitrariness to allow or re-
quire the imposition of the death penalty under [such] circum-
stances."" In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Court held it was reversible
error for the prosecution to argue to the jury that the appellate
courts, and not the jury, would have the final word on the appropri-
ateness of the death penalty." Justice Marshall wrote for the Court
that "for a sentencer to impose a death sentence out of a desire to
avoid responsibility for its decision presents the spectre of the imposi-
tion of death based on a factor wholly irrelevant to legitimate sentenc-
ing concerns."97 Justice O'Connor concurred, stating that the prose-
cution's misinformation "creat[ed] an unacceptable risk that 'the
death penalty [may have been] meted out arbitrarily or capriciously,' 98
or through 'whim ... or mistake."'"
ss 
"Arbitrary and capricious" has also been considered by the Court in capital cases to
include concepts such as "whim or mistake," Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 343 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring)), "whim, caprice or prejudice," Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1144
(1994)(Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), and "caprice or emotion,"
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
94 486 U.S. at 384.
Id. at 374.
" 472 U.S. at 336, 340-41.
97 Id. at 332.
pa Id. at 343 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992,
1020 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)).
99 Id. at 343 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 118 (O'Connor,
J., concurring)); see also Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1019-20 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that
jury instruction informing jurors of governor's power to commute a life sentence had jury
guessing about commutation and parole, and "(s)entencing decisions based on such
groundless predictions are clearly arbitrary and capricious"); id. at 1030 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that telling the jury about the "rarely exercised power of commuta-
tion" has 'no greater justification than an instruction to the jury that if the scales are
evenly balanced, you should remember that more murders have been committed by peo-
ple whose names begin with the initial 'S' than with any other letter").
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There is ample evidence gathered that capital jurors do indeed
impose death based on arbitrary factors in individual cases. The Capi-
tal jury Project, a National Science Foundation-funded multi-state re-
search project, began the unprecedented endeavor of interviewing
jurors who served in capital cases. Beginning in 1990, researchers
from different disciplines interviewed 1115 jurors in 340 capital trials
in 14 different states. 100 Interviewers found that jurors had profound
misunderstandings of the law that tilted the balance toward death,
including erroneous beliefs that: the law required them to impose
death upon finding an aggravating circumstance; aggravating circum-
stances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; mitigating
circumstances did have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and
jurors had to agree unanimously on a mitigating circumstance to vote
against death. 101 Interviewers also found that jurors exhibited racial
bias in imposing death, 02 or chose death simply to avoid a hung
jury.'°3 They also chose death because they succumbed to pressure
100
	
Cornell Death Penalty Project, About the Capital Jury Project, http://www.
lawschool.cornell.edu/library/death/cjp.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
101 See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin 'T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in
Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1993) (summarizing data from interviews with
capital jurors in South Carolina); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sen-
tencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 Ixn. L.J. 1161, 1165-76 (1995) (summarizing
data from interviews with capital jurors in North Carolina). In addition, in several mock
juror studies, jurors did not understand the difference between aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and mistakenly thought mitigating circumstances were aggravating. See
Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of
California's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAW & HUM. BElinv. 411, 420-24 (1994); Peter
Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 U'EAD
L. Rix. 1, 13-23.
102 See William J. Bowers et al., Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis
of the Role of Jurors' Race and Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 187, 252-55
(2001) (showing white males are most likely to vote for death, whereas most black jurors
initially choose life, and giving narrative accounts of white jurors manipulating and intimi-
dating black pro-lifers); see also Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital
Selection and the Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimi-
nation, 45 Wm. & MARY L. REV, 2083, 2107-19 (2004) (summarizing the studies showing
that racial bias continues to plague capital selection); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of
Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on fury Decisions, 92 Micti. L. REV. 63,
96 (1993) (citing studies suggesting that "juror race plays a larger role in sentencing deci-
sions than it does in decisions about guilt or innocence"). But see Laura T. Sweeney & Craig
Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Studies, 10
BEIIAV. SCI. & L. 179, 181-83 (1992) (disputing generalizations about studies showing
jurors' racial bias and suggesting that stronger results of such bias were associated with
older studies or confined to Southern states).
las See Marla Sandys, Cross-Overs—Capital Jurors Who Chang Their Minds About the Pun-
ishment: A Litmus Test for Sentencing Guidelines, 70 IND. L.J. 1183, 1221 (1995) (stating that
the primary concerns of life-to-death crossovers are "the desire to avoid a hung jury and
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from other jurors, including statements by other jurors reducing a
sense of responsibility,'" because they vastly underestimated the time
the defendant would serve if given life, 105 or because they wrongly be-
lieved life without parole was not really life without parole." 6
Thus far, we have simply wrung our hands at these findings. After
all, this arbitrariness is inevitable in a system designed only to reduce
the risk of arbitrariness. However, because such decision making vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment command of Furman, and the result is to
send a man wrongfully to his death, the system has an obligation to
address these findings in a legal venue.
the fear of the defendant's early release from prison"). In another study, the author re-
lated the following exchange between the interviewer and the juror regarding juror's deci-
sion to change his vote from life to death:
Q: You changed?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: What caused you to change?
A: We just quit. It was either that or we deadlocked.
Q: And you didn't want to be deadlocked.
A: That's something else that bothered me. Somebody made a comment, I
thought of it later. "Well, after all this time and money, how could we vote and
have a hung jury?" And that bothered me because I thought when you are
voting on somebody's life, you have to be able to live with the decision—what
makes the difference.
Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the Ruck7—Juror Misperception of Sentencing Responsibility in Death
Penalty Cases, 70 IND. U. 1137, 1146 (1995).
1" See Bowers et. al, supra note 102, at 252-55, 258 (giving narrative accounts of jurors'
techniques to intimidate pro-lifers, including "isolating a holdout juror, claiming that the
law requires a death sentence for the defendant's crime, asserting the holdout will not be
responsible for the defendant's execution, ... telling the holdout that the death sentence
will be imposed even if he or she does not vote for it[,] " and even coaching the holdout as
to how to respond at polling); Hoffman, supra note 103, at 1156 (finding that jurors use
ways to overcome or avoid their sense of personal moral responsibility, and techniques
used against holdouts included telling them their vote was only a recommendation, the law
told them what to do, and that they had said in vole dire they could sentence someone to
death). Of course, a death sentence founded on a juror's shifting of responsibility is un-
constitutional. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 332, 340.
105 See William]. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death by Default: An Empirical Demon-
stration of False and Forced Choices in Capital Sentencing, 77 TEX. L. REV. 605, 634-38, 671
(1999) (showing that in states that permit parole, capital jurors vastly underestimate the
time that first-degree murderers not given death will stay in prison, and that death votes
correspond with how much time the juror believes the defendant will serve).
106 See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Deadly Paradox of Capital jurors, 74 S. CAL. L. REV.
371, 396 (2001); Benjamin D. Steiner et al., Folk Knowledge as Legal Action: Death Penalty
Judgments and the Tenet of Early Release in a Culture of Mistrust and Punitiveness, 33 LAW &
SOC'Y REV. 461, 481 (1999).
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B. The Need for a Record
In order to expose arbitrary decision making, we need a record.
In administrative law, there is a built-in procedure for reviewing an
agency's decision for "arbitrary and capricious" decisions: the deci-
sionmaker must make a complete and thorough record of the reasons
for the decision.m Although the review for arbitrariness is narrow, the
requirement of a record is broad. In a seminal administrative law de-
cision, the Court stressed that if the "bare record" does not "disclose
the factors that were considered or the [decisionmaker's] construc-
tion of the evidence it may be necessary for the District Court to re-
quire some explanation" and to "require the administrative officials
who participated in the decision to give testimony explaining their
action." 108
Peppered throughout the Court's death penalty cases is evidence
of the Justices grappling with the absence of a record. A pattern
emerges where the majority and dissent guess at the impact on the
capital jury of some improper factor. 09 In California v. Brown, the ma-
jority and the dissent disputed whether the "reasonable juror" would
have discounted mitigating circumstances in the face of an instruction
ordering the jury not to make a decision based on "mere sympa-
thy.""° In Caldwell and in Mills, as previously discussed, the majority
and the dissent engaged in similar debates. In delivering the majority
opinion in Mills, Justice Blackmun emphasized, "There is, of course,
no extrinsic evidence of what the jury in this case actually thought. We
have before us only the verdict form and the judge's instructions."
107 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43-44 (finding it "relevant that Congress re-
quired a record of the rulemaking proceedings to be compiled and submitted to a review-
ing court").
1" Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S, 402,420 (1971).
109 See Samuel R. Gross, Race, Peremptories, and Capital Jury Deliberations, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 283,285-86 (2001) ("It is a central theme of many appellate decisions on jury
decision making: We don't want to know.... Once we decide that we can't know what ju-
ries do, we may safely 'presume' that whatever it is, it's okay. But what about death penalty
cases?... Should we not be more careful to make sure that in these difficult and extremely
important cases jurors understand the law correctly and apply it fairly?"); see also Weisberg,
supra note 16, at 346 ("[W]e can only find error harmless when we can reconstruct the
jury's likely reasoning to determine whether changing one variable in the trial would or
might have changed the result. If a penalty decision is a subjective one involving 'myriad'
and 'countless' factors, however, an appellate court can never be sure that adding or sub-
tracting any one factor could not possibly have affected the result.")
110 479 U.S. 538,541-43 (1987); id. at 548 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
111
 486 U.S. at 381; see also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370,381-82 (1990) (holding
there was no "reasonable likelihood" that jurors misunderstood the judge's instruction as
precluding the consideration of mitigating evidence of the defendant's background and
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Justice Marshall criticized appellate review based on guesswork in
his dissent in Barclay v. Flanda." 2 After a majority of the Court decided
that a state trial court's consideration of an improper nonstatutory
aggravating factor did not result in the "wholly arbitrary" imposition
of death, 1 " Justice Marshall lamented that "[p]rotecting against the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty 'must not become simply a
guessing game played by a reviewing court, "114 and that "Ulf appel-
late review is to be meaningful, it must fulfill its basic historic function
of correcting error in the trial court proceedings. A review for cor-
rectness reinforces the authority and acceptability of the trial court's
decision and controls the adverse effects of any personal shortcom-
ings in the initial decisionmaker." 115 It was easy for Justice Marshall
thereafter to complete his argument that meaningful appellate review
would have made a difference in Barclay, however, because the trial
judge who made the decision to impose death, against the recom-
mendation of the jury, placed his reasons on the record. 116
character); Boyle, 494 U.S. at 405-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (coming to opposite conclu-
sion); Mills, 486 U.S. at 383 ("No one on this Court was a member of the jury that sen-
tenced Ralph Mills, or of any similarly instructed jury in Maryland. We cannot say with any
degree of confidence which interpretation Mills' jury adopted."); Brown, 479 U.S. at 551
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ('The fact that jurors could have interpreted the instruction so as
to make it lawful is irrelevant, for 'we cannot be certain that this is what they did do.'")
(quoting Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526 (1979)). In Weeks v. Angelone, the Court
was presented with the rare occasion of having actual evidence that the jurors wrongly
believed death was mandatory where it was not: the jurors had asked the trial court a ques-
tion that revealed their confusion. 528 U.S. 225, 228-31 (2000). In response, the trial
judge merely reread them the same confusing instruction, and they returned a death ver-
dict. Id. A bare majority of the Court upheld the death sentence, holding that "[alt best,
petitioner has demonstrated only that there exists a slight possibility that the jury consid-
ered itself precluded from considering mitigating evidence"). Id. at 236. The dissent, how-
ever, retorted, "[t] he record in this case establishes, not just a 'reasonable likelihood' of
jury confusion, but a virtual certainty." Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A study con-
ducted after the case repeated the Weeks instructions to mock jurors, and approximately
40% of them erroneously believed the instruction required them to return a death verdict.
Stephen P. Garvey et al., Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital
Cases, 85 CORNELL L. Rzv. 627, 636 (2000).
112
 463 U.S. 939, 987-88 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 950-51.
114 Id. at 987-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56,
59-60 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983)).
115 Id. at 988-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
516 Because of this record, Justice Marshall was able to expose in dissent that the trial
judge had a pattern of making the same "lawless" determination in other cases—ignoring
the jury's advisory sentence of death, recounting his experiences during WWII and recit-
ing "boilerplate language to the effect that he was not easily shocked but that the offense
involved shocked him." Id. at 980-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Of course, there is such a record in noncapital sentencing. Al-
though overturning a trial judge's sentence in a noncapital case is
rare because a judge has complete discretion to sentence within a
statutory range, there are a few examples where a higher court has
reversed a sentence imposed by a trial judge. Then-Justice Rehnquist
reviewed two of those decisions in Zant v. Stephens." 7 United States v.
Tucktina and Townsend v. Burki119 were two noncapital sentencing de-
cisions vacated for resentencing. In both cases, the defendant was able
to show an error of constitutional magnitude in the sentencing be-
cause the trial judge had placed his reasons for the sentence on the
record. In Tucker, two uncounseled convictions were introduced
against the defendant in sentencing. 120 Justice Rehnquist noted that
the Court there observed that "the sentencing judge gave 'explicit'
and 'specific' attention to these convictions" and, had the judge
known the true character of convictions, he would have had a "'dra-
matically different'" picture of the defendant."' Justice Rehnquist
then noted that in Townsend, "an uncounseled defendant was sen-
tenced following a proceeding in which the trial judge explicitly and
repeatedly relied upon the incorrect assumption that the defendant
had been convicted of several crimes." 122
Ironically, Justice Rehnquist cited those two cases as support for
his argument that every capital defendant has an opportunity to prove
a claim that the sentencer would have acted differently had the error
not occurred, and that the defendant in Zant failed to meet that bur-
den.'" Yet, the defendant had no such opportunity in Zant because
he had no access to the jurors' reasons for imposing death." 4 Thus, in
Zant, when the jury imposing death was found to have relied on an
"7 462 U.S. at 902-03 (Rehnquist,,]., concurring).
118 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
118 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
128 404 U.S. at 447.
121 Zant, 462 U.S. at 902 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting Tucker, 404 U.S. at 444,
447-48); see Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447 ("The record in the present case makes evident that the
sentencing judge gave specific consideration to the respondent's previous convictions
122 Zant, 462 U.S. at 903 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see Townsend, 334 U.S. at 740 ("We
are not at liberty to assume that items given such emphasis by the sentencing court, did
not influence the sentence ....").
128 462 U.S. at 903-04 (Rehnquist, j., concurring).
124 See id. at 864-68. Likewise, in McCieskcy v. Kemp, there was simply no ability to make
the proof of racism the Court sought. The Court acknowledged as much: "Controlling
considerations of public policy dictate that jurors cannot be called to testify to the motives
and influences that led to their verdict." 481 U.S. at 296 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
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aggravating factor subsequently deemed invalid, a majority of the
Court upheld the death sentence based on guesswork that the aggra-
vating circumstance had "an inconsequential impact on the jury's de-
cision regarding the death penalty." 125
 In dissent, Justice Marshall dis-
puted that assumption: "There is no way of knowing whether the jury
would have sentenced respondent to death if its attention had not
been drawn to the unconstitutional statutory factor: 126
If noncapital defendants can challenge their sentences through
access to the sentencer's rationale, capital defendants should have this
ability, for even more important reasons. Although it is unlikely that a
review of a trial judge's sentence in a noncapital process will bear
fruit, the capital sentencing process is different. First, any room for
arbitrariness or error in the sentencing scheme means the difference
between life and death and not the difference between ten years and
twenty years. In imposing the death penalty, there should be as little
margin for error as humanly possible. 127 Second, nonarbitrary imposi-
tion is constitutionally required in capital cases by the Eighth
Amendment.
The reason we have no record of jurors' reasons for imposing
death is simple, and yet quite foreboding. To suggest scrutiny of a jury
verdict is to suggest something quite un-Arnerican 128 and mutinous. As
a nation, our rhetoric in committing to jury secrecy is not unlike our
commitment to every word in the Pledge of Allegiance. The defenses
to both are steeped in history, tradition, and mysticism or spirituality.
125 462 U.S. at 889 (quoting Zan t v. Stephens, 297 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Ga. 1982)).
126 Id. at 905 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("Death, in its finality, dif-
fers more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a
year or two.... ['Mere is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."); see also Ed-
dings, 455 U.S. at 118 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the Court's obligation has
been "to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will
guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of
whim, passion, prejudice or mistake").
125 Indeed, in 1955, upon hearing that Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., was planning to
videotape actual jury deliberations as part of a University of Chicago study, the Internal
Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary held hearings to consider the
issue of jury "bugging," and questioned members of the research team about their associa-
tions with communism. See Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of Past-
Verdict Interviews offurors, 82 IowA L. REV. 465, 530 & n.344 (1997) (describing incident).
As a result of the hearings, Congress passed a statute precluding tape recording of jury
deliberations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (2000).
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A jury without secrecy is like a nation without God. 129 Each provides a
protective layer, or at least a veneer, to our sense of well being. There
is a fear that if we scratch beneath the surface, a profound meaning-
lessness might reveal itself.
Yet, surprisingly perhaps, the rhetoric of jury secrecy is much
stronger than the reality. The commitment to jury secrecy post-verdict
is uneven and many of the reasons supporting it are surprisingly weak.
Nonetheless, to suggest a wholesale review of jury secrecy is impracti-
cal and unwarranted. On the other hand, to consider here, for the
first time, whether the Eighth Amendment commands easing the de-
mands of jury secrecy in death penalty sentencing proceedings is a
realistic and worthwhile endeavor.
N. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS AGAINST REVIEWING JURY SENTENCING
The origins of jury secrecy are murky,'" at best, but it has been
an assumed concomitant of the jury trial since its inception."' To-
day's practice of jury secrecy takes three basic forms. First, the jury
deliberates in secret, with no recording or transcription device in the
room."2 Second, evidentiary rules prohibit jurors from testifying
1 r9 See WILLIAM HOLDSWOR'lli, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 317 (AL. Goodhart &
Hanbury, eds., 7th ed. 1956) ("The jury is regarded as a formal test to which the par-
ties have submitted. The judgment follows, as under the old system, the result of that test.
But to ask in what manner one of the old tests worked, to lay down rules for its working,
would have been almost impious; for are not the judgments of God past finding out? The
record tells us that when the jury was first introduced the method by which it arrived at its
verdict inherited the inscrutability of the judgments of God."); Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy,
Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process—The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L.
REv. 15, 44 (1990) ("'The general verdict is as inscrutable and essentially mysterious as the
judgment which issued front the ancient oracle of Delphi.'") (quoting Edson R. Sunder-
land, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 258 (1920)).
' 3° As Justice Cardozo lamented, it was a practice with "its origin in inveterate but
vague tradition, and where no attempt has been made either in treatise or in decisions to
chart its limits with precision.' Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
"I See Abraham S. Goldstein, Jury Secrecy and the Media: The Problem of Posevenlict Inter-
views, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 295 ("For most of the petit jury's long history, and certainly
since the 19th century, the secrecy of jury deliberations has been taken for granted. Like
the outcome in trial by ordeal or trial by combat, the jury verdict has been regarded as
divinely inspired.").
132 See 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (2000) (precluding tape recording of jury deliberations);
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 743 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing that it
is a "'cardinal principle that the deliberations of the jury shall remain private and secret in
every case'") (quoting FEU. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) advisory committee's note on 1983 amend-
ments); Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Cameras in the Jury Room: An Unnec-
essary and Dangerous Precedent, 28 Am. ST. L.J. 865, 885, 885 n.134 (1996) (noting that in a
majority of states, the secrecy of jury deliberations is a matter of common law); Clifford
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about anything that occurred in the jury room with the exception of
the intrusion of an extraneous influence.'" Third, local rules in many
jurisdictions place restrictions on litigants interviewing jurors post-
verdict about their deliberations.'" While the latter two forms are far
from consistent in their enforcement of jury secrecy, the end effect of
all three is to protect against the doomsday prediction that to reveal
jury deliberations would be to end the jury system as we know it.'"
Juries are inefficient decisionmakers, but we value them for a
host of reasons related to their messy humanity.'" juries interpose the
community between the State and the accused citizen. 157 Juries are
desirable because they bring twelve different, and fresh, views to the
table. 1" With the positive aspects of humanity, however, also come all
Holt Ruprecht, Note, Are Verdicts, Too, Like Sausages?: Lifting the Cloak of fury Secrecy, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 217, 250-51 n.139 (1997) (listing nine state statutes specifically proscribing the
recording of deliberations, and six other state statutes imposing restrictions).
' 33 See, e.g., FED. R. Evil). 606(b).
' 34 See Susan Crump, fury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is
the Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 526-28 (1988)
(discussing variety of local rules); Benjamin M. Lawsky, Note. Limitations on Attorney Post-
verdict Contact with furors: Protecting the Criminal Jury and its Verdict at the Expense of the Defen-
dant, 94 Comm. L. REV. 1950, 1955-56 (1994) (gathering local rules).
1" See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987) ("There is little doubt that
postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances lead to the invali-
dation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior. It is not at all
clear, however, that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it."); Goldstein,
supra note 131, at 314 (quoting WILLIAM R. CORNISH, THE JURY 258 (1968)) ("We proceed
at our peril, therefore, both constitutionally and functionally, when we challenge one of
the jury's core characteristics. The inscrutability of the jury verdict, and the secrecy
through which it is maintained, 'is surely [such] a characteristic ... [and] is bound to last
as long as the jury system itself. Once the inscrutability principle has gone, the time has
come to set up another kind of tribunal.'") (alteration in original); see also John H. Wig-
more, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. Jun. Soc'v 166, 170 (1929) (*The jury,
in the privacy of its retirement, adjusts the general rule of law to the justice of the particu-
lar case.... The jury, and the secrecy of the jury room, are the indispensable elements in
popular justice.").
138 See Peter N. Thompson, Challenge to the Decisionmaking Process—Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 606(b) and the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 Sw. L.J. 1187, 1219-20 (1985) ("Ju-
rors bring to the jury room a full range of human characteristics and weaknesses that pre-
clude a totally sterile, objective, rational analysis of the evidence and instructions.").
137 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) ("Providing an accused with the
right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the cor-
rupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If
the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but
perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it.").
"8 See Hans Zeisel, . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U.
Cm. L. REV. 710, 715 (1971) ("The jury system is predicated on the insight that people see
and evaluate things differently. It is one function of the jury to bring these divergent per-
ceptions and evaluations to the trial process.").
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forms of prejudice, preconception, and nearsightedness."9 Support-
ers of jury secrecy say we must take the good with the bad. 149 To open
up jury deliberations for scrutiny, they say, would threaten finality,
undermine the role of the juror as the primary fact finder, encourage
jury tampering and harassment, suppress freedom of discourse
among jurors, and undermine public confidence in the jury system.
Although these arguments have varying levels of merit in the
context of any criminal jury trial—indeed, some appear rather
"thin"141— they are particularly difficult to defend in a capital case.
Unlike any constitutional safeguard in a noncapital trial, the Eighth
Amendment commands focus on the substantive results of the process
in the penalty phase of a capital tria1. 142 Because, as a constitutional
matter, a jury may not impose a death sentence arbitrarily or capri-
ciously, a defendant must be able to meaningfully challenge the jury's
reasoning, and can do so only with access to that reasoning. 143
139 The risk of juries injecting their own views or beliefs has long been recognized. As
Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed, the jury's strength in keeping "the administration
of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the community" is also "precisely one
of their gravest defects from the point of view of their theoretical function: that they will
introduce into their verdict a certain amount—a very large amount, so far as I have ob-
served—of popular prejudice." OLIVER WENDELL HOLM Es, Law in Science and Science in
Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210, 237-38 (1920).
149 See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 429 E2d 1019, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1970) ("We
cannot expunge from jury deliberations the subjective opinions of jurors, their attitudinal
expositions, or their philosophies. These involve the very human elements that constitute
one of the strengths of our jury system ."); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Junes and the Death
Penalty, 41 CASE W. Res. L. REV. 1047, 1056 (1991) ("There is a point at which we must
either accept the irreducible core of discretion inherent in the function of juries or con-
fess that we do not want juries making the decision at all."); Sandra D. Jordan, The Criminal
Trial fury: Erosion of fury Power, 5 HOWARD SCROLL: THE Soc. JUST. L. REV. 1, 56 (2002)
("Individual bias is a part of human nature and cannot ever be eliminated through voir
dire, blue ribbon juries, or professional juries. Human nature is just that—human.");
Vanessa L. Bellino, Note, Is the Power to be Lenient Also the Power to Discriminate? An Analysis of
Justice Blackmun's Evolving Perspective on fury Discretion in Capital Sentencing, 5 TEMP. POL. Be
Civ. Rrs. L Rev. 75, 84 (1995) ("[W]e must either accept the jury for what it is—a collec-
tion of human beings vulnerable to human biases and prejudices—or eliminate its role in
the capital sentencing process.").
141 See Alschuler, supra note 69, at 227 ("The justifications offered for the rule against
the impeachment of jury verdicts by jurors seem thin, and one may wonder whether this
rule has served other goals that courts have been reluctant to avow.").
142 In a noncapital trial, the due process and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial
emphasize fair procedure and not results. Litigants have had little success using the Sixth
Amendment to challenge the evidentiary prohibitions on revealing jury deliberations. See,
e.g., Tanner, 483 U.S. at 126-27 (holding that denying juror testimony of drug and alcohol
use during trial does not violate the Sixth Amendment).
143 Sec Higginbotham, supra note 134, at 1049 ("[R]esponding to perceptions that the
death penalty is imposed in a capricious and irrational manner requires an inquiry such as
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This Part first discusses the current status of procedures and
practices surrounding jury secrecy, showing that in actuality the legal
system's commitment to secrecy post-trial is not inviolate. Next, this
Part shows that the constitutional concerns in a capital trial substan-
tially outweigh the modern rationales supporting secrecy rules.
A. The Current Status ofJury Secrecy
The legal system's commitment to secrecy of jury deliberations is
quite divided: although the jury deliberates in absolute secrecy, the
treatment of that secrecy post-trial is riddled with exceptions, incon-
sistencies, and confusion. Commitment to jury secrecy post-trial can
be measured by courts' adherence to Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b), or its state counterparts, which prohibits jurors from im-
peaching their own verdicts through testimony. 144
 Application of the
rule demonstrates that courts are torn over its inhibition of the truth-
finding function of a criminal tria1. 145
this to focus on the jury. The jury shapes the debate about reform, because in the final
analysis the nature of the jury's decision making cannot be changed.").
144
 Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) states, in part:
[A] juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's at-
tention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror.
FED. R. FVID. 606(b).
145
 Various judges have expressed their views on the illogic of the rule over time.
Shortly after the rule was imported into the common law, Tennesee's Judge Whyte, in
Crawford v. State, decried its existence:
But it is said in the argument, the receiving [sic] the affidavit of jurors is
against public policy; it would expose them to the [sic] being tampered with,
the effect of which would be numerous applications to set aside verdicts. The
like objection applies to every witness—the possibility of being practiced
upon.... A verdict under such circumstances is to be approached with great
caution and great circumspection; but it is not altogether intangible, and be-
yond the reach of the redressing power of the court; if it were, I for one
would think it a defect in the administration of the justice of the country, and
a defect in the policy of the law.
10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 60, 67, 69 (1821). Judge Learned Hand advised courts to avoid the rule
that jurors are incompetent to testify to impeach their verdict, and to look at the facts.
Jorgensen v. York Ice Mach. Co., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cu: 1947). Chief Justice, then
Judge, Burger agreed:
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Rule 606(b) is not an absolute prohibition on juror testimony
about occurrences in the jury room. It prohibits juror testimony on
the mental processes involved in deliberations, but it does admit ju-
ror testimony on extraneous influences on the jury verdict. 146 Testi-
mony that is typically precluded under the Rule includes evidence of
juror misunderstanding or intentional disregard of court instruc-
tions, a verdict achieved through compromise, consideration of the
defendant's failure to testify or of inadmissible evidence, misgivings
about the verdict, agreement on a time limit for decision, inability to
hear or comprehend the trial, coercion or harassment of fellow ju-
rors, lack of intention to unqualifiedly vote guilty, basing the verdict
on secret beliefs or prejudices unrelated to the law or facts, mistake
in returning verdicts, and improper inferences from a co-
defendant's guilty plea."7
The list of excluded testimony is contrary to both the truth-
finding and fairness goals of a criminal trial. If one reads through
the cases rejecting juror testimony under Rule 606(b), uncorrected
miscarriages of justice leap off of the page: jurors deciding to con-
vict based on visions, 148 due to intense pressure from other ju-
The crux of the problem would be more clear if we regard the issue not as
the admissibility of the juror's affidavit but rather its sufficiency for purposes of
impeaching the verdict. We should not dispose of this case on a ground of
admissibility; rather we should view it as Judge Hand did and consider what
the affidavit says, and assuming its truth for these purposes then decide
whether it should lead to a reversal.
Klimes v. United States, 263 F.2d 273, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
146 The reason for the distinction was that, although allowing testimony as to outside
influences was capable of proof,
[t]o allow a juror to make affidavit against the conclusiveness of the verdict by
reason of and as to the effect and influence of any of these matters upon his
mind, which in their very nature are, though untrue, incapable of disproof,
would be practically to open the jury room to the appliances of parties and
their attorneys, and, of course, thereby to unsettle verdicts and destroy their
sanctity and conclusiveness.
Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210-11 (1866).
147 See FED. R. Evw. 606(b) advisory committee's note (giving examples); Jay S.
Horowitz, Impeaching Jury Verdicts, in THE JURY 1987: TEC1INIQUES FOR TIIE TRIAL LAWYER,
at 583-84 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 340, 1987) (giving
examples and citing cases); Thompson, supra note 136, at 1208 (same).
148 See United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding inadmissible
evidence that a juror wrote the defendant that she had "eyes and ears that • see things
before it [sic] happen" and claiming that 'a curse was put on them some years ago");
Hutchinson v. Laughlin, 102 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951) (holding inadmissible
evidence of an astrological investigation by the jury foreperson); State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d
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rors, 149
 due to time constraints, 15° or simply based on mistake. 151
What is so striking about this practice is that it comes at the tail
end of a trial stacked with procedures designed to ensure a reliable
outcome— Illustrat[ing] a central dynamic of American criminal
justice: Millions for procedure but not one dime for outcome." 152
The decision to preclude this testimony "reflects a policy judgment
that the interest in accurate and rational decision making is sub-
81, 83-84 (Utah 1988) (excluding evidence that a juror claimed she had received a divine
sign of the defendant's guilt).
149 In United States v. Roach, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held inadmissible a ju-
ror affidavit attesting to juror pressure. The court noted that the affidavit stated that the
juror had been unwilling to convict but that the other jurors had pressured her into
changing her vote" and that "one juror told her the judge would incarcerate her if she
failed to do her civic duty and vote to convict." 164 F.3d 403, 413 (8th Cir. 1998) (para-
phrasing affidavit). In addition, the court stated the juror's affidavit indicated that "there
were racial overtones in the jury room," she was "one of two Native American jurors, and
for a time she was the only holdout against convicting the three Native American defen-
dants. She said other jurors made references to her race and one said '[i]t was ten white
people versus one Indian.'" Id. The court further noted that the juror's affidavit indicated
she was diabetic and that "other jurors told her that she could get something to eat with
them after a verdict was returned." Id.; see also United States v. Brito, 136 F.3d 397, 414 (5th
Cir. 1998) (holding inadmissible a juror affidavit stating that the juror experienced "inter-
nal coercion" due to harassment by other jurors); United States v. Tallman, 952 F.2d 164,
166 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding inadmissible a juror's claims of "harassment and insults" from
other jurors); United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1366 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding in-
admissible a juror's claim of experiencing "duress" during deliberations due to alleged
harassment or intimidation by other jurors); United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d 778, 786
(4th Cir. 1982) (holding there was no basis to impeach a verdict where a juror claimed the
foreman "'scared [her] to death'") (alteration in original); Anderson v. Miller, 206 F.
Supp. 2d 352, 360-62 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding inadmissible testimony from two jurors,
who cried and were almost inaudible during polling, and who said they had been coerced
and intimidated by fellow jurors); Oxtoby v. McGowan, 447 A.2d 860, 869-70 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1982) (holding inadmissible a juror affidavit claiming coercion); State v. Frank-
lin, 534 S.E.2d 716, 719 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding inadmissible a juror affidavit claim-
ing that the juror had been coerced to vote guilty).
155 See United States v. Graveley, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding inadmis-
sible evidence that jurors, who had requested an opportunity to comment on their verdicts
but were denied, told press that they thought defendant innocent but rendered the guilty
verdicts because of extreme time pressure).
151
 See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 764 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding inadmissible
a juror's statement to the judge thirty minutes after the verdict that she had only voted
guilty with reservations); Aguilar v. State, 242 S.E.2d 620, 623 (Ga. 1978) (excluding
affidavits of three jurors stating they thought the defendant should have been convicted of
manslaughter even though they voted to convict him of murder).
1s2
	 supra note 69, at 226; see also Ruprecht, supra note 132, at 243 ("There is
something comically inconsistent about the scrupulous observation of proper procedure
and formal proof during the trial, and the final submission of the cause to a deliberative
body that operates free of all rational constraint with a request that it return a verdict un-
justified by reasons.").
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servient to the interest of finality" and "represents a commitment
to democratic decision making and not necessarily a commitment
to finding the truth."'"
In a noncapital case, the decision to favor the finality of the jury's
decision in order to preserve this democratic institution has an inevita-
ble appeal. Therefore, in 1915, in McDonald v. Plus, the Court set the
tone for the rule by declaring that, although the jurors in the case
would have testified that they "adopted an arbitrary and unjust method
in arriving at their verdict," forgoing this proof was "the lesser of two
evils."154 In a capital case, however, those values are reversed. Fifty-seven
years after McDonald, the Court in Furman v. Georgia identified arbitrary
and unjust methods for arriving at death as a primary evil in capital tri-
als. 155 In capital cases applying Rule 606(b), lower courts have rejected
testimony that, if allowed, would have shown that a juror arbitrarily im-
posed death, including testimony that jurors voted for death because of
speculation that the defendant would be released in a few years if given
life and not executed if given death, 156 or that the governor would
commute a life sentence,'" or because of a feeling of reduced respon-
sibility because it was a retria1, 1 " or due to coercion or mistake.'"
"3 Thompson, supra note 136, at 1188.
"4 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915).
In See generally 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curnun).
156 See McDowell v. Calderon, 107 F.3d 1351, 1367 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated in part, 130 F.3d
833 (9th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (excluding affidavit of holdout juror that stated that other jurors
had become increasingly angry with her, told her that 'without parole" meant the defendant
could be paroled within ten to fifteen years, and asserted the defendant would not be exe-
cuted because no one was being executed in California, and that she had voted for death be-
cause she did not want him released and did not believe he would be executed); Silagy v. Pe-
ters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding inadmissible testimony that during the
sentencing phase, one juror told others that the defendant would serve no more than five to
seven years if they sentenced him to life, and that even if they gave him death, he would never
be executed, but would spend no more than seven years in prison).
157 See Bloom v. Vasquez, 840 F. Supp. 1362, 1377-78 (C.D. Cal. 1993), tru'd on other
glaunr1.1, 143 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997), (holding inadmissible evidence that one juror told
others that with a life sentence defendant would be eligible for parole in seven years, that sev-
eral jurors opined he would never be executed, and that two jurors who initially were in favor
of life voted for death after a discussion among the jurors regarding the possibility of life being
commuted by the governor).
155 See Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 682-83 & n.8 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that, although a
court could admit evidence that the jury became aware from an outside source that defendant
had already been sentenced to death by another jury and the sentence had been reversed on a
technicality, a statement by a juror regarding the effect of this knowledge was not admissible,
where the juror indicated that it "'lessen [edi our sense of responsibility ... bemuse we felt that
twelve other rational people had sentenced Mr. Fullwood to death.'") (alterations in original).
159 See Gosier v, Welborn, 175 F.3d 504, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1999) (excluding juror's claim
that he voted for death because he could not convince other jurors to be lenient and appar-
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Even if a rule of post-verdict secrecy is defensible in noncapital
cases, the courts are not always consistent in enforcing its boundaries,
Courts' manipulation of the basic terms of Rule 606(b) demonstrates
the lack of integrity in the Rule. For example, courts have been in-
consistent in their determinations of whether something was an in-
ternal or an external influence. 160 The easy manipulation of this fea-
ture of the Rule is demonstrated by the widely criticized decision of
Tanner v. United States, where the Supreme Court held that juror in-
toxication during trial was not an extraneous influence. 161 Without
considering juror testimony as to the existence, much less the effect,
of this impropriety, the Court upheld the defendants' convictions. 162
Even if a court were to find that intoxication were an external
influence, however, the Rule precludes juror testimony as to its ef-
fect.' 63 Instead of simply allowing the juror to testify to the effect,
judges guess.'TM In Sassounian v. Roe, the Ninth Circuit admitted that
ignoring a juror's own testimony that extraneous information caused
her to vote to find the defendant eligible for death lent an "'Alice in
ently did not recognize that unanimity was required to impose the death penalty); State v.
Hessler, 734 N.E.2d 1237, 1251-52 (Ohio 2000) (holding inadmissible a juror affidavit
wherein the juror claimed she only voted for the death penalty after being demeaned and
harassed).
160 See Alschuler, supra note 69, at 223 ("The scope of the exception has proven prob-
lematic, and its application has yielded strange results."); James W. Diehm, Impeachment of
Jury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. Rev. 389, 421 (1991)
(demonstrating that defining what is an '`outside influence' has been "troublesome");
Sharon Blanchard Hawk, Note, State v. Mann: Extraneous Prejudicial Information in the Jury
Room: Beautiful Minds Allowed, 34 N.M. L. REV. 149, 154-61 (2004) (collecting cases show-
ing the arbitrariness of courts' distinctions between external and internal as to jurors'
professional knowledge).
'6' 483 U.S. 107, 120, 125 (1987).
' 62 See id. at 125-26, 134.
'63 See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 121 n.5 (1983) (per curiam) ("A juror may testify
[as to outside influences]. . . . But a juror generally cannot testify about the mental process
by which the verdict was arrived."); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) ("[A]
juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extra-
neous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind."); see
also United States v. Greer, 223 F.3d 41, 54 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding inadmissible juror tes-
timony as to the impact of extra-record information on the ability to be fair and impartial
because the juror affidavit contained strictly mental conclusions); Pyles v. Johnson, 136
F.3d 986, 992 (5th Cir. 1998) (excluding juror affidavit stating that she made an unauthor-
ized visit to the crime scene and only then was convinced of defendant's guilt because the
affidavit contained strictly mental conclusions), cited in Jeffrey C. Corey, Thirty-First Annual
Review of Criminal Procedure: Trial: Influences on the Jury, 90 Geo. L.J. 1636, 1643 n.1647
(2002).
1 " "Though a judge lacks even the insight of a psychiatrist, he must reach a judgment
concerning the subjective effects of objective facts without benefit of couch-interview in-
trospections." United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Wonderland quality'" to the court's determination of the effect that
the extraneous information had upon her. 165
Perhaps because of the idiosyncrasies of the Rule in operation,
the Supreme Court has simply ignored its implications on occasion.
In Smith v. Phillips, the Court found that due process required that a
hearing be held to resolve a claim of juror bias. 166 The Court affirmed
the trial court's finding of no bias, based in part on the testimony of
the allegedly biased juror that the supposed bias did not affect his de-
liberations. 157 Rule 606(b) would have precluded such a hearing, but
the Court did not even mention the Rule.'" Similarly, in Rushen v.
Spain, the Court gave short shrift to Rule 606(b) in a footnote 169 and
held there was no constitutional violation due to a juror's personal
knowledge of the crime, based in, part on her testimony in a post-trial
hearing that it did not affect her impartiality.'" In both cases, the
Court easily dispensed with the claim by hearing from the juror her-
self. 171
The foregoing discussion of Rule 606(b) demonstrates that
commitment to jury secrecy, at least post-trial, is not as monolithic as
might have been assumed. The Rule allows inquiry into some areas
while forbidding inquiries into others, and courts' application of the
Rule has been less than consistent and logical. The basic form of the
Rule, however, will continue to be supported by Congressm because
165 230 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting People v. Sassounian, 226 Cal. Rptr.
880, 914 (Ct. App. 1986)).
166 455 U.S. 209, 218 (1982).
167 See id. at 218-20.
168 See id. at 222 (O'Connor, j., concurring) (supporting necessity of post-trial hearing
to resolve claims of juror bias because "[a] hearing permits counsel to probe the juror's
memory, his reasons for acting as he did, ... his understanding of the consequences of his
actions[,] .... [and] also permits the trial judge to observe the juror's demeanor under
cross-examination and to evaluate his answers in light of the particular circumstances of
the case").
169 464 U.S. at 121 n.5.
170 Id. at 120-21.
171 Courts have also avoided the internal-external distinction in the face of evidence of
racial bias. Sce, e.g., Wright v. United States, 559 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(finding "potential constitutional difficulties in applying Rule 606(b) to all allegations of
racial prejudice" and the "better rule ... is to analyze each such claim on a case by case
basis"); Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1978), affd 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.
1978), (holding that the rule should not be applied dogmatically" where an offer of proof
showed racial bias in the jury room).
172 Indeed, in May 2004, the Advisory Committee on the Evidence Rules recom-
mended approval of an amendment to Rule 606(b) which would clarify the narrowness of
the scope of the exception for impeachment of the verdict. See ADVISORY COMMIYITE oN
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its persistence is tied to its symbolic quality as the guardian of jury se-
crecy.'" On the other hand, no one has really questioned its applica-
tion in capital cases in light of Eighth Amendment commands. The
political, judicial, and symbolic costs of lifting such a rule in capital
cases is substantially less. Further, although the rationales given in
support of jury secrecy may justify its use in noncapital cases, they
simply cannot justify its use in capital cases.
B. The Modern Rationale forJury Secrecy' 74
1. Finality
Finality is a powerful justification for jury secrecy. In McDonald,
one of the first modern cases endorsing the evidentiary ban on jury
testimony impeaching verdicts, the Supreme Court proclaimed the
virtue of finality:
Met it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and
publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on
the testimony of those who took part in their publication
and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an
inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might
invalidate the finding.'"
Of course, verdicts can and are attacked through jury testimony
about extraneous influences on the verdict under Rule 606(b). None-
theless, there is still a blanket preclusion of inquiry into the mental
processes of jurors. The concern is very real that verdicts are deli-
cately arrived at and maintained and, given the vagaries and emotions
EVIDENCE RULES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES (May 15,
2004), available at h ttp:/ /www.uscou rts.gov/ ru les/comment2005/ EVMay04.pdf#page=16.
175 Cf. Kate Stith-Cabranes, The Criminal fury in Our Time, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y L. 133,
144 (1995) ("The venerable rule against jurors impeaching their own verdict is breaking
down slowly but surely.").
174 This Article does not discuss either the ancient rationale supporting jury secrecy—
that the jury was divinely inspired—or the rationale that first supported the importation of
a no impeachment rule into common law—that jurors were incompetent to testify to their
own moral turpitude. See Hot.nswoRTH, supra note 129, at 317; Brodin, supra note 129, at
44. See generally Wise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (KB. 1785). Neither rationale supports
the practice today. See, e.g., Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Cal. R. 57, 59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (repu-
diating reasoning by Mansfield because juror evidence of misconduct is "the best and
highest evidence").
175 238 U.S. at 267.
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of twelve separate human beings, no verdict could withstand the scru-
tiny. 176
In the context of capital cases, however, finality must take a back
seat to overriding constitutional concerns.'" Finality has a unique
meaning in a capital case. Because death itself is final, the Supreme
Court has recognized a heightened concern for reliability in the pro-
cess. Finality in death weighs in favor of more scrutiny, not less." 8 As
Justice Breyer recently said, "I believe we should discount ordinary
finality interests in a death case, for those interests are comparative in
nature and death-related collateral proceedings, in any event, may
stretch on for many years . . . . "179
A protracted appellate process is already in place to ensure the
protection of a capital defendant's constitutional rights. 180 In a death
case, the sentence is not final until the defendant is executed, and the
appellate process often continues up until the moment of execution.
Disallowing litigation of an Eighth Amendment claim by a capital de-
176 Sec Jorgensen, 160 F.2d at 435 ("[I]t would be impracticable to impose the [require-
ment] of absolute perfection that no verdict shall stand, unless every juror has been en-
tirely without bias, and has based his vote only upon evidence he has heard in court. It is
doubtful whether more than one in a hundred verdicts would stand such a test ...
[judges] would become Penelopes, forever engaged in unravelling the webs they wove.");
Crump, supra note 134, at 534 ("The granting of new trials based on jurors' mental proc-
esses is prohibited because it would be anathema to stability; indeed, the setting aside of
jury verdicts on any but the most egregious grounds would cost more in terms of stability
and finality than it could possibly gain."); Thompson, supra note 136, at 1187 ("[T]oo
close a look at jury deliberations will reveal improprieties in a large number of cases, dam-
aging the finality and public acceptance of jury verdicts.").
177 See Mark Cammack, The Jurisprudence of fitly Trials: The No Impeachment Rule and the
Conditions for Legitimate Legal Decisioninaking, 64 U. Cow. L. Rol. 57, 77-79 (1993) (stating
that finality is an important efficiency concern, but it also could justify curtailment of al-
most any constitutional right).
178 See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 87 (1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring in the
judgment) ("In capital cases the finality of the sentence imposed warrants protections that
may or may not be required in other cases."); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99
(1983) (stating that the qualitative difference of death "requires a correspondingly greater
degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination").
' 79 Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2530 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188 To be sure, the Court has, however, "'erected unprecedented and unwarranted
barriers'" to federal court review of constitutional claims of capital defendants. Callins v.
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1158 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 351 (1992) (Blackmun, J. concurring)). Congress
has done the same through the passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act in 1996. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 8
U.S.C., and 22 U.S.C.).
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fendant, while allowing litigation of other constitutional claims, does
not advance finality significantly enough to justify it.
Indeed, having jurors provide reasons for their sentence may ac-
tually aid in finality. The appellate process is currently steeped in
guesswork about whether a jury did or did not understand its instruc-
tions, or whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury ver-
dict would have been different. 181 Hearing from the jurors themselves
could aid in what is essentially a fact-finding process.
Most importantly, unlike in noncapital cases, defendants in capi-
tal cases have an Eighth Amendment right to non-arbitrary imposi-
tion of death. The only effective method for realizing this right is to
expose arbitrariness in the decision by scrutinizing the jury's decision-
making process. Finality concerns, while important, should not shield
from view evidence establishing the arbitrary imposition of death in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
2. Jury as Primary Factfinder
Another rationale for secrecy in deliberations is that it is neces-
sary to preclude encroachment on the jury's fact-finding function.
One primary purpose of the criminal jury is to interpose the commu-
nity between the criminal defendant and the power of the govern-
ment. 182 The concern is that if a trial court or an appellate court were
allowed to make a searching review of the jurors' reasons for their
verdict, it could simply substitute its own ideals for the ideals of the
community. 183
The foundation of this belief is largely historical. The history of
the rise of the jury trial is the story of a power struggle between judges
and juries. 184 Judges initially reached out to change juries' verdicts of
181 For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
182 See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156.
183 See, e.g., Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Speth, 404 F.2d 291, 296 (8th Cir.
1968) (If a court could attempt to 'correct' a verdict by general inquiry of a jury, even
though the questioning is well-intended and seemingly innocuous on the surface, the pro-
tected cloak of privacy around a jury's deliberations would be permanently shattered.");
Victor Gold, /tow Competency to Testify that a Verdict was the Product of Racial Bias, 9 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 125, 136-37 (1993) ("If jurors could be made to testify as to the
thought processes that formed the foundation of a verdict, then any exercise of their
power inconsistent with the values of the judge could be detected and controlled.");
Thompson, supra note 136, at 1222 ("If the essential role of the jury is to serve as a check
on governmental tyranny in the exercise of the laws, then the jurors must be free from
government scrutiny and possible retaliation.").
184 See John H. Langbein, The Criminal That Before the Lawyers, 45 U. Cm. L. REV. 263,
284-300 (1978) (describing history).
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acquittal. 185 There is an important distinction between this history—
which can leave one cold about the ability of judges to bow to the de-
cisions of jurors—and the modern day. Since the nineteenth century,
acquittals by juries have been beyond the power of the courts to over-
turn."° Through the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment,
a verdict of not guilty, and, similarly, in the capital penalty context, a
decision of life over death, is final. 187
The dictates of double jeopardy law are consistent with the his-
torical value of the jury as community arbiter. Because of the power
struggle over acquittals, the framers believed one of the key values of
the jury was its ability to acquit in the face of government overreach-
ing, even if it believed the government had proven a crime. 188 In capi-
tal cases, juries exercised this power to nullify in order to temper a
mandatory death penalty. 189 The abilities to nullify and show mercy
are the unique features of a jury drawn from the defendant's com-
munity. Those features of the jury trial system would remain un-
touched by a review of a jury's reasons for imposing death. A jury's
decision to exercise mercy, no matter how arbitrary, is unreview-
On the other hand, appellate courts expend a great deal of time
and energy reviewing the penalty phase of a capital case for harmless
las See id. at 297-300.
180 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the
United States, 61 U. Cut. L. REV. 867, 912-13 (1994) (finding that, by the nineteenth cen-
tury, Americans agreed judges could not direct verdicts of conviction or reverse jury ac-
quittals).
157 See U.S. CoNsr. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...."); Buffington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446
(1981) (holding double jeopardy applies to a penalty phase determination of a life sen-
tence).
18a Sec Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 186, at 873-74 (discussing that one of the jury's
historic functions was to nullify, as in the seditious libel cases brought by the English
Crown); Nancy jean King, The American Criminal Jury, 62 LAw & CoNTEmr. PROBS. 41, 50
(1999) (noting that nullification "provided a shield against British oppression before the
Revolution").
' 89 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 292-93 (1976) (reciting history of ju-
ries' rejection of a mandatory death penalty).
tso Sec Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S, 153, 199 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,
JJ.) (writing that nothing in Furman "suggests that the decision to afford an individual
defendant mercy violates the Constitution"); see also United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977) (holding that the jury has the "overriding re-
sponsibility to stand between the accused and a potentially arbitrary or abusive Gov-
ernment that is in command of the criminal sanction" and that "[t] he trial judge is
thereby barred from attempting to override or interfere with the jurors' independent
judgment in a manner contrary to the interests of the accused").
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error. Information from the jurors themselves supports the jury's
facffinding function and enhances the accuracy of the court's deci-
sion. 191
3. Jury Tampering
Another argument in support of jury secrecy is that allowing jurors
to impeach their verdict will encourage harassment of jurors. 192 Yet., by
far, the most direct and efficient rule for preventing harassment is to
prosecute, or impose disciplinary proceedings against, anyone who har-
asses a juror.'" Juror harassment is already precluded by ethical rules. 194
This concern is no different from a concern that lawyers and litigants
might browbeat or harass witnesses, urging them to testify in a favorable
manner. 195 A lawyer or two may well engage in this behavior, but the
remedy is to punish those individuals, not to preclude relevant testimony.
Closely linked to this concern is a fear about a more subtle coer-
cion. A juror may already feel uncomfortable about her verdict, particu-
larly a decision to impose death, and a good defense lawyer could con-
vince her to confess to having made the wrong decision due to some
external pressure. The argument is that in imposing a death sentence,
some jurors will have compromised, because compromise is a necessary
ingredient to unanimity, and may have lingering regrets about it that
can be unearthed by a sympathetic defense attorney. Precluding jurors
from testifying about their motivations prevents those lingering regrets
from undermining verdicts. 196
191 See Thompson, supra note 136, at 1219 ("[T]he appellate function has become
largely a fact-finding function in which the transcript is reviewed and evidence is reas-
sessed. The courts must assess both the appropriate weight and the strength of various
inferences to be drawn from the evidence and the possible inferences that the jury drew or
might have drawn from the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence in determining
what impact the error had or might have had on the deliberations and proceedings.").
192 See McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267 ("Jurors would be harassed and beset by the de-
feated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish
misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict.").
195 Accord Alschuler, supra note 69, at 227.
1.94 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-108(D) (1980) ("After
discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with which the lawyer was
connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make comments to a member of
that jury that are calculated merely to harass or embarrass the juror or to influence
his actions in future jury service.").
195 Sec Thompson, supra note 136, at 1224 ("The process of interviewing jurors af-
ter a verdict does not appear to present more of an opportunity for unseemly conduct
on behalf of the interviewer than the process of interviewing witnesses prior to the
trial.").
196 See id. at 1220-21 (making this argument).
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It is certainly true that convincing twelve citizens to condemn
someone to death is a daunting task, and, if achieved, no doubt jurors
will develop regrets. Regret over having to carry out this unpleasant task
as a citizen does not undermine a death sentence validly imposed. If a
juror does utilize this regret in order to fabricate the circumstances of
his or her decision, then the fear over post-verdict juror testimony will
have been realized. However, a juror may also come forward to testify
that the pressure of time, the coercion of his fellow jurors, or the in-
structions of the judge to break a deadlock caused him to join a decision
with which he did not agree. In the latter case, the imposition of death
violates Furman's mandate. To make the decision to impose death be-
cause of pressure or coercion is an arbitrary and capricious choice and
not a "reasoned moral response." 19" Although we may be able to coun-
tenance that sort of interplay between twelve human beings in a non-
capital context, if it leads to an imposition of death in a capital case, the
sentence is unconstitutional. Therefore, the answer to the problem of
the fabricating witness lies in the crucible of adversarial testing rather
than the suppression of testimony.
4. Free and Open Deliberations
Fostering free and open deliberations is by far the most persuasive
reason behind jury secrecy. This has driven the practice from the earliest
times. Justice Cardozo stated, "Freedom of debate might be stifled and
independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their
arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world."' 98 This
197 See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (empha-
sis omitted).
198 Clark, 289 U.S. at 13.
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theme was echoed by the courts and continues to be a primary ration-
ale today. 200
This rationale is somewhat undermined by the fact that most ju-
rors are already aware that a fellow juror may speak with the media
and reveal jury deliberations 201 Litigants may be under some con-
straints by a court order or local rule, but, by and large, they are also
free to talk to the jurors about deliberations post-verdict, Therefore,
any perceived restraint on free and open discussion in the jury room
caused by later revealing to a court jurors' reasons for imposing death
likely would be marginal. 2°2
There is still a legitimate concern, however, that if jurors know
ahead of time that their sentencing decision in a capital case will be
scrutinized by a court, the possibility could have an impact on the de-
liberations. 203
 Yet it would defeat the purpose of enforcing the Eighth
199 See, e.g., McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267-68 ("[1] he result [of allowing jurors to impeach
verdicts] would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant sub-
ject of public investigation—to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion
and conference); Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 460 (1871) ("[I]t is essential to the
freedom and independence of their deliberations that their discussions in the jury room
should be kept secret and inviolable; and to admit the testimony of jurors to what took place
there would create distrust, embarrassment and uncertainty."); In re Cochran, 143 N.E. 212,
213 (NN. 1924) ("Public policy requires that [jurors] be given the utmost freedom of debate
...."); In re Nunns, 176 N.Y.S. 858, 873 (App. Div. 1919) (Putnam, J., dissenting) ("[W]hat
juror says and how he votes is within the seal of secrecy for all time. How could justice be
administered through results of free conference, unless jurors understand that their delib-
erations in the jury room are inviolable, and that the reasons for their verdict cannot be
questioned." (quotations and citations omitted)).
20° One of the reasons is to encourage unanimity. See M'Kain v. Love. 20 S.C.L. (1 Hill)
506, 508 (S.C. CL App. 1834) ("We know from experience, that in questions admitting of
any doubt, the only possible means of arriving at unanimity of opinion amongst many, is by
a free interchange of thought, and to deny it to a jury would be to defeat the object of trial
by jury."); John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 477, 494 (2002)
(stating concern that "jurors would be less willing to reach consensus if they knew that
their compromises would be later revealed to the public").
201 Judges cannot issue orders preventing jurors from voluntarily seeking out the press
to talk about their deliberations. See Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y
Rev. 389, 417-18 (1994); Thompson, supra note 136, at 1225 (explaining that jurors are
free to talk about their deliberations and courts have been unwilling to enjoin journalists).
202 See Alschuler, supra note 69, at 226 ("If the prospect that jurors will recount the
conduct of other jurors in these [public] forums does not inhibit frank discussion, dis-
courage jurors from taking unpopular stands, and undermine the public's confidence in
jury verdicts, it seems doubtful that the prospect of disclosure in a court of law would do
so.").
203 Psychologists have determined that "jurors are better able to resist normative pres-
sure when their judgments are made anonymously." SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S.
WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 191 (1988),
cited in Kenneth S. Nunn, When furies Meet the Press: Rethinking the Jury's Representative Func-
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Amendment proscription against arbitrary imposition of death if the
kind of juror comments that most revealed arbitrariness were driven
underground due to the prospect of discovery. Therefore, the need to
enforce the Eighth Amendment must be balanced against this con-
cern and is best addressed by the method chosen to facilitate the ju-
rors' disclosure of their reasons for imposing death. For example,
placing a video camera in the jury deliberation room is potentially
more damaging to juror freedom of expression than granting post-
trial interviews with litigants. The selection of a balanced method will
be explored further in Part V. 204
5. Public Confidence in the Jury
There are two aspects of the argument that jury secrecy is im-
perative to public confidence in the jury system. First, "the commu-
nity's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of lay people would
... be undermined by a barrage of post-verdict scrutiny of juror con-
duct."205 Hence, if the community saw jurors continually coming for-
ward to impeach their own verdicts, the community would despair of
the process. This argument depends, first, on the existence of "a bar-
rage." This is of little concern when confined to capital cases, which
are relatively few in number. 20° This argument also depends upon an
assumption that the public would rather close its eyes than have
wrongs righted, an assumption that lies outside the mainstream view
of the value of public proceedings. 2°7 In any case, current community
Lion in flighty Publicized Cases, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 905, 431 (1995); see Goldstein,
supra note 131, at 314 ("(P]reviously anonymous jurors, reaching a group decision based
on 'community values' and lay perspectives, will feel they must justify it in the court of
public opinion."); Marder, supra note 128, at 526 ("If jurors know that their thoughts or
views may later be exposed by other jurors, then they may focus on their safety or their
standing in the community. They may give more weight to how their views will play out in
the community rather than to what has transpired in the courtroom." (citation omitted)).
204 For a discussion of methods of recording deliberations and the reasons recording
deliberations should be rejected, see infra notes 215-36 and accompanying text.
205 Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121; see Marder, supra note 128, at 498 (arguing that judges and
jurors "may have a duty to appear more certain than they feel so that the parties and pub-
lic will accept the decision").
206 As Nancy King noted, "[C]apital jury trials are relatively uncommon. Of the 2,000
to 4,000 defendants a year charged with a crime that makes them eligible for the death
penalty, only about six to fifteen percent receive a death sentence, an average of about 250
death sentences per year." King, supra note 188, at 64.
207 "American society looks askance at decision-making that takes place behind closed
doors. This is illustrated by the ubiquity of open-meeting laws as well as the prevalence of
video cameras in courtrooms and legislatures. The jury deliberating in secrecy on a gen-
eral verdict represents a dramatic exception." Brodin, supra note 129, at 105. The public
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trust in the results of the capital process may be at a new low because
it is now common knowledge that innocent men sit on death COW. 2"
Public confidence in the sentence of death may well improve if the
jury is required to be accountable for its reasons for imposing
death.209
 It is also widely known to the public that capital cases are re-
versed, retried, and appealed again because of error. One more
ground of error in the form of juror testimony is unlikely to tip the
balance against trust in the jury system.
A second component of the argument for jury secrecy is that se-
crecy is thought necessary to "preserve public confidence in a system
which more intimate knowledge might destroy." 21 ° The underlying
reason, then, is "'the widespread belief that jury deliberations may not
live up to an ideal of enlightened exchange of views and sifting of evi-
dence, and that the jury as an institution might not survive close scru-
tiny of its deliberative process."2 " This may well be true, but it is by
no means a known quantity. Exposing to appellate scrutiny jurors'
rationales for imposing death will reveal mistakes, bias, and caprice,
but it will also reveal thoughtful and serious deliberations. The very
concern that we will see what we fear—arbitrariness in imposing
helps legitimate judicial proceedings by "assuring that proceedings are conducted fairly;
discouraging perjury, misconduct of participants, and biased decisions; ... ensuring public
confidence in a trial's results through the appearance of fairness; [and] inspiring
confidence in judicial proceedings through education regarding the methods of govern-
ment and judicial remedies." In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 1990);
see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) ("People in an
open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them
to accept what they are prohibited from observing."); Akhil Reed Arnar, Sixth Amendment
First Principles, 84 Gr.o. L.J. 641, 680 (1996) ("[T]he public trial was designed to infuse
public knowledge into the trial itself, and, in turn, to satisfy the public that truth had pre-
vailed at trial.").
208 Since 1973, over one hundred people have been released from death row with evidence
of their innocence—eight in 2000, nine in 2001 through 2002, ten in 2003, and six in 2004. See
Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty. Exonerations by Year
(Feb. 9, 2005), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=412&scid=6itinn-yr-rc.
209 See Jackson, supra note 200, at 486 ("[A]ccountability can help to legitimate the po-
sition of the decision makers, as increasingly in liberal democracies decision making must
be transparent if there is to be any public confidence in it.. „ [A]ccountability can en-
hance respect for the individuals affected by the decisions made as it guarantees them
some scrutiny over these decisions.").
210 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF Guar. A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL
TRIAL 268 (3d ed. 1963), quoted in Cammack, supra note 177, at 78.
2" Brodin, supra note 129, at 20 n.25 (quoting CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER "ITIE RULES: TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 12-13 (4th ed.
2000)); accord Alschuler, supra note 69, at 227; Thompson, supra note 136, at 1225.
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death—counsels that we open our eyes to the Eighth Amendment vio-
lation. 212
In sum, the Eighth Amendment mandate against arbitrary impo-
sition of death is not outweighed by the public policy rationales put
forth to support jury secrecy. The Supreme Court has not declared
jury secrecy to be of constitutional dimension, 213 and it is unlikely to
achieve that status. 214 The collection of age-old practices protecting
the jury's mental processes from intrusion inhibits the search for jus-
tice in capital cases. Shedding those practices in capital cases would
cost little and greatly benefit the criminal justice system, capital de-
fendants, and the public. Having shaken off the vestments of jury se-
crecy, then, the more difficult question is how to implement a mean-
ingful and effective review of the jury's decision to impose death.
V. METHODS OF ENFORCING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
There are two distinct methods for gaining information from the
jurors about their decision making. The two methods are recording
jury deliberations or questioning jurors after the verdict. Although
recording obviously occurs at the point of deliberations, questioning
can occur at two points—either before the jurors are dismissed,
through a post-verdict voir dire or questionnaire, or at any point after
the jury has been dismissed, through interviews with the parties. This
Article concludes that recording deliberations is wholly inadequate to
the task, and that the second method of jury questioning is most likely
to reveal more reliable information after the jury has been dismissed.
21s
	 Brodin, supra note 129, at 41 ("[C]ontroversial questions that are difficult to re-
solve in the open political arena are shunted into the black box where they can be handled
discreetly, beyond close scrutiny."); Weisberg, supra note 16, at 395 ("The development of
the formal model [of the penalty trial], at least in the long run, suppresses more than it
answers the moral and political questions that ought to be addressed before we execute
people.").
21!
	 e.g., Goldstein, supra note 131, at 297.
214 The Court has decided that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not in-
clude either a twelve-member jury, Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970), or a unani-
mous jury, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 906 (1972), even though both were fixed
features of the jury system at the time of the Amendment's adoption. The operative ques-
tion is whether the incident is part of the "essential feature" that lies in the "interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen,
and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that
group's determination of guilt or innocence." Williams, 399 U.S. at 100. Lack of complete
secrecy in deliberations does not harm that function. As Akhil Reed Amar has posited,
"inscrutability and muteness are not the essence of juries." Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing
Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1187 (1995).
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Although there are some questions of reliability inherent in any inter-
views with jurors, shedding light on juror arbitrariness is far superior
to allowing it to continue in the dark. 215
A. Recordingjury Deliberations
There are two basic problems with recording jury deliberations as
a method for uncovering arbitrary decision making in capital cases.
First, recorded deliberations inform us what was said, but do not in-
form us what was not said. While the recording may produce some
useful evidence of bias, pressure, or legal misconceptions, it is likely
that some, if not most, prejudice, error, and caprice will be unspoken.
In addition, some jurors may not speak because they are timid or si-
lenced.216 Others may not feel free to state their reasons out loud be-
cause they are in the minority or are feeling pressured by other jurors.
A verdict, while collective, is also individual. Although the group may
choose to impose death, individuals may not agree on the reasons. A
juror may have imposed death because she felt pressure to do so or
'^ was mistaken about the law, neither of which may be reflected in a
recording. Meaningful appellate review of decisions to impose death
requires knowledge of the rationale of each and every juror. Because
the decision must be unanimous, a single juror's arbitrary imposition
of death requires a reversal of the sentence. 217
Second, if there is one place in the process where secrecy makes
some sense, it is during the deliberations in the penalty phase of a
capital case. One of the accepted and embraced roles of the jury is to
213 See Sandra Day O'Connor, Juries: Thcy May Be Broken, But We Can Fix Them, 44-Jun.
FED. LAW. 20, 25 (1997) rip uries are a great institution, with a proud history. As we ap-
proach the 21st century, however, we need to make sure we do not remain so wedded to
practices hailing from the 20th, or the 18th, or the 13th, that we make it difficult for juries
to do their job well. It is my hope that everyone concerned with the proper functioning of
our justice system will take this issue seriously, to think hard about ways in which juries can
be made to work better, and not to fear change simply because it is different.").
216 See Nunn, supra note 203, at 437 n.174 (citing studies showing that at least three
minority jurors are required to withstand the pressure of a nine-person racial majority on a
jury); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 MARY. L. Rxv. 1261, 1296
(2000) (suggesting that women jurors may participate at lower rates than men in mixed-
gender settings such as juries).
2" See, e.g., Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 1995) (Ile number of jurors af-
fected by the misconduct does not weigh heavily in the prejudice calculus for even a single
juror's improperly influenced vote deprives the defendant of an unprejudiced, unanimous
verdict."); United States v. Delaney, 732 F.2d 639, 643 (8th Cir. 1984) ("If a single juror is
improperly influenced, the verdict is as unfair as if all were.'") (quoting Stone v. United
States, 113 F.2d 70, 77 (6th Cir. 1940)).
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act as the conscience of the community and, as such, to exercise
mercy. If jurors knew that their deliberations were being recorded for
review in case of a death sentence, their tendencies to cross their t's
and dot their i's would bias the process in favor of death, 218 First, it is
often difficult to justify in words why mercy should be exercised when
faced with a murderer; mercy is an exercise in human forgiveness.
The law does not require such articulation. Second, the practice of
checking boxes and articulating reasons tend to favor a decision to
impose death. In a capital case, the jury will often find the defendant
to be death-eligible after weighing aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, but the decision whether to exercise mercy after that point
will be discretionary. It is far easier to justify death in words than it is
to justify mercy.
Even if this were not the effect of recordings, there is still a le-
gitimate concern that free and open debate will be inhibited. 219 If ju-
rors knew their deliberations were being televised or transcribed, they
might not feel as free to state their thoughts or opinions for a variety
of reasons: they cannot articulate them well, their ideas are unpopular
or make an individual juror sound biased or racist, or they have any of
a host of other reasons.22° Although it is possible that recording delib-
erations may have the positive effect of making jurors behave more
civilly, or may encourage accountability, 22I if the purpose of reviewing
218 Similarly, special verdict forms in criminal cases have been criticized as tending to
guide a jury toward guilt. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969)
("There is no easier way to reach, and perhaps force, a verdict of guilty than to approach it
step by step.").
21° The effect of televising jury deliberations has been debated. Compare Abramovsky &
Edelstein, supra note 132, at 874 (noting that, although jurors in the PBS documentary
nullified the conviction and therefore may have seemed unaffected, they exhibited the
"Hawthorne effect," which occurs when '`Ipleople aware that they are being observed
alter their behavior (in this case, adopting vast eloquence and extreme circumspection) to
meet what they imagine to be the expectations of the observers'") (alteration in original),
with William R. Bagley, Jr., Note, Jury Room Secrecy: Has the Time Come to Unlock the Door?, 32
St/flout U. L. Rev. 481, 502 (1999) ("Although the CBS and PBS documentaries provide a
limited pool of information from which to draw any absolute conclusions, they demon-
strate that jurors will concentrate on the task before them and forget about the presence
of a recording devise [sic].").
22° See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 132, at 892 Of jury deliberations are rou-
tinely recorded, any gain in accountability is offset by the damage to free debate in the
jury room ....").
221 Sec Amar, supra note 214, at 1187 (suggesting videotaping deliberations as educa-
tional material); Jackson, supra note 200, at 486 ("If decision makers have to explain their
decisions to the community or to some reviewing body, then it is more likely that their
decisions can be justified."); Ruprecht, supra note 132, at 217 (arguing that jury delibera-
tions should be transcribed as part of the record and subject to a limited judicial review).
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the deliberations is, in part, to ferret out bias or prejudice, then sub-
merging the expression of those feelings thwarts that goal.
Therefore, although recording jury deliberations has the advan-
tage of providing a true transcript of what was spoken, it will favor the
articulate, potentially help spawn a death verdict, and may drive evi-
dence of bias or prejudice underground. The costs of this method
outweigh its benefits.
B. Post-Sentence Questioning
Another point in the process where we can determine whether
jurors acted arbitrarily in imposing the death penalty is while the jury
is still empanelled and just after it is polled in open court as to a
unanimous decision for death. 222 Two distinct methods could be em-
ployed: a post-sentence voir dire or a post-sentence questionnaire,
either written or oral. However, the drawbacks of these methods lie in
the fact that they would occur in the control and presence of institu-
tional pressures to affirm the decision.
The voir dire format would require that each juror be questioned
individually,223 in the presence of the judge, the prosecution, and the
defense. The questions would likely begin with the open-ended ques-
tion of why the juror voted for death followed by more discrete ques-
tions, pinpointing specific areas of concern. The clear benefit of such
a format is that it would occur both close in time to the deliberations,
when memories are fresh, and in the presence of all parties.
However, the drawbacks stem from those same factors. The tim-
ing is problematic because human nature will invariably lead the juror
to defend the awesome decision she has just made, rather than ex-
pose its weaknesses. 224 Additionally, the presence of all parties in this
222 Although polling is designed to ensure the verdict represents the verdict of each
individual juror, it is merely a "yes" or "no" question and is not conducive to discovering
arbitrary decision making.
2" Individual questioning is crucial for a host of reasons: it permits more honest an-
swers outside the pressure of fellow jurors; the decision to impose death must be the indi-
vidual's own decision, and not just the group's; and jurors are not required to unani-
mously agree on which mitigating circumstances were proven, see Mills v. Maryland, 486
U.S. 367, 384 (1988).
22  See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 230 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Gliven
the human propensity for self-justification, it is very difficult `to learn from a juror's own
testimony after the verdict whether in fact he was 'impartial." Certainly, a juror is unlikely
to admit that he had consciously plotted against the defendant during the course of the
trial." (quoting Phillips v Smith, 632 F.2d 1019, 1022 (2d Cir. 1980) (citation omitted))),
revel 455 U.S. 209 (1982); Thompson, supra note 136, at 1218 ("The jurors [post-verdict)
have a substantial self-interest in providing testimony that is consistent with the validity of
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format is not conducive to thoughtful and honest reflection by the
juror. In such close quarters with the judge—the symbol of the
authority and power of the justice system—the juror will be less likely
to reveal anything inopportune. Moreover, the pattern of questioning
would very likely imitate that of individual voir dire during jury selec-
tion: each party would attempt to coach the juror as to the "right" an-
swer to the question, and the judge would exercise his or her institu-
tional or political pull toward finality.225
The other option at this point in the process is to give each juror
a questionnaire after returning a death sentence, to be filled out pri-
vately and individually before being excused. The questionnaire
would become part of the record on appeal. Compared to the voir
dire format, this format has the advantage of occurring outside the
intimidating and influential presence of the judge and the lawyers. A
disadvantage here is that some jurors may be illiterate, others may be
intimidated by the written format, and some jurors will be more ar-
ticulate than others.
However, the overwhelming problem with this format is, as with
post-sentence voir dire, that it suffers from the weakness of timing and
location. Again, occurring moments after the jurors have just come to
the very difficult decision to send a man to his death, the human urge
to defend this decision will be at its zenith. Given the timing and the
courthouse setting, the jurors would rightly perceive the question-
naire as asking for an articulation of their reasons, but may not per-
ceive it is as a method to expose any weaknesses in the reasoning. 226
The tendency may well be to rubberstamp the proceedings and leave
their verdict. They have taken a public position on the issue and may be reluctant to pro-
vide testimony that they may have acted improperly in arriving at that position.").
223 Studies have shown that jurors are not always forthcoming in the setting of jury se-
lection. Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503,
528 (1965) (concluding that jurors often lie on voir dire), cited in Anne Bowen Poulin, The
fury: The Criminal Justice System's Different Voice, 62 U. Cm. L Rev. 1377, 1428 n.272 (1994);
Susan E. Jones, fudge- Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation of Juror
Candor, 11 LAW & Hum. BctrAv. 131, 145 (1987) (study revealing three ministers lied on
voir dire), cited in Poulin, supra note 224, at 1428 n.272; see also David Suggs & Bruce D.
Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 250-68
(1981) (arguing that procedures used during voir dire and the psychological atmosphere
in which it takes place are virtually guaranteed to inhibit rather than facilitate self-
disclosure of juror prejudice).
226 Professor Amar has suggested that if a criminal jury "would like to," it could explain
its reasons for its verdict, perhaps by allowing a clerk assigned to the jury to help "compose
a statement of reasons that will enhance public understanding and education." Amar, supra
note 214, at 1187. This suggested reform is not aimed at, nor will it achieve, exposure of
the jurors' errors, caprice, or bias.
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the courthouse as quickly as possible. Although that may not always be
the case, it must be remembered that the goal here is to find the best
method for exposing arbitrariness, not the best method for justifying
the verdict.
C. Post-Trial Interviews of furors
Post-trial interviews of jurors may be the most reliable method for
gathering evidence that exposes arbitrariness in the decision to im-
pose death. The interviews would be conducted outside the intimidat-
ing setting of the courthouse and the judge. Although there are dis-
tinct disadvantages to this method as well, the criminal justice system
is designed to handle these disadvantages.
Under this method, the interviewer will most likely be a defense
attorney. Although the Eighth Amendment mandate may benefit the
entire criminal justice system as well as the public, the reality is that
the only party with a concrete institutional interest in uncovering ar-
bitrariness is the defendant. Therefore, the person most likely to seek
out the jurors post-trial is the defense attorney. It is concededly less
than ideal to rest the burden of this Eighth Amendment function
squarely on the shoulders of the defense attorney. It requires compe-
tent and diligent counsel who will take the time, not only to interview
the jurors, but to do it well. A competent defense attorney would con-
sult psychologists and death penalty specialists to craft questions that
would be most likely to elicit honest and informative responses. Un-
fortunately, competent defense counsel is often the exception. The
reality here is that no reform of the capital system is effective without
improvement in the competency levels of capital counsel. This pro-
posal rises or falls dependent upon the availability of competent
counsel.
In order to facilitate post-trial interviews and the subsequent in-
troduction of the juror's testimony into a court of law, courts must re-
move basic impediments. Because the rules prohibiting contact with
jurors and prohibiting juror testimony as to their mental processes lack
convincing rationale and conflict with and undermine the Eighth
Amendment constitutional mandate, this proposal calls upon courts to
find the operation of those rules unconstitutional in capital cases.227
227
 Justice Ginsburg has suggested easing the harshness of Rule 606(b) in capital cases:
While precedent supports the Fifth Circuit's affirmation that statements at-
testing to the juror's understanding of the instructions are inadmissible, the
statements [the defendant] submitted do assert that apprehension of a lesser
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The advantage of post-trial interviews is that they allow the juror
the time and space to reflect upon the decision and give an honest
assessment of what she thought and did; and of what she observed
others saying or doing. 228 If a juror is going to expose weaknesses in
the process, she is more likely to do it here than in the courthouse.
However, it is also true that some jurors will take advantage of the op-
portunity to change their minds or remember things differently. 229
Defense attorneys are not neutral parties and they will, at the very
least, encourage such revelations.
The answer to this problem is the same as it is in any criminal case.
The vagaries of human recall never justify forgoing witness testimony.
After a post-trial interview, the juror will testify at a hearing and will be
subject to cross-examination. Although our adversary system is by no
means a model of perfection for finding the truth, it is the closest we
have come. Whereas the concern of the prior proposals is that jurors
will reveal too little or rubberstamp the decision, here the danger is in
overstating or fabricating evidence of arbitrariness. Post-sentence ques-
tioning might prevent information from coming before the court,
whereas this method more likely involves too much information, both
reliable and unreliable, which courts are used to weighing.
What kinds of testimony might the court hear and what can we
expect the court to do with it? There are potentially four categories of
statements jurors may make. First, there are statements showing the
juror to have been mistaken about the law. For example, a juror may
have believed that the mitigating factors needed to be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt or that, once aggravating factors were found to
sentence the judge might impose in fact caused jurors to vote for a death sen-
tence. On a matter so grave, I would not discount those statements altogether.
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 416 n.19 (1999) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
229 Asking jurors what other jurors said or did may be the only way of discovering evi-
dence of racial bias. See, e.g., Taylor-Thompson, supra note 216, at 1287-88 (jurors of color
can help identify when race is "in play," using a process described as "going meta," which
may permit the juror of color to observe the degree to which race affects and infects the
jury deliberation process").
229
 Short of getting inside a juror's mind, any interview process is going to have its fail-
ings. "[W]hat people say about their own behavior can be very unreliable." Nunn, supra
note 203, at 437 n.171. People forget, lie, and exaggerate, as well as tell the truth. See Ste-
phen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 26, 29 (2000)
(describing the limitations of juror interviews, such as: answers may be less than forthright,
may be what the juror thinks the interviewer wants to hear, or may be the answers believed
the most socially acceptable; the juror's memory may have faded or changed since the
time of trial; and the juror may be biased by hindsight).
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outweigh mitigating factors, death was mandatory. In these cases, the
court must discover what effect the mistake had on the juror's deci-
sion. In order to uphold the death sentence, the state must prove to
the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the juror's mistake did not
affect the outcome. 230 If the juror explains that she would have voted
for death in any case, then the mistake did not infect the verdict. But,
if the juror says she believes she may have voted for life if she had un-
derstood the law correctly, then the death sentence must be vacated.
A second category of statements is a juror's disclosure that some
irrelevant factor, external to the merits of the decision, infected her
decision. For example: "I just gave up;" "I wanted to go home;" "The
other jurors told me that he would never be executed;" "If I voted for
life, he would have been back on the streets in five years;" or "As the
only black juror, I felt a lot of pressure to join the others and vote for
death." Again, in this case, the court could affirm the death sentence
only if it could find beyond a reasonable doubt that those beliefs did
not affect the juror's vote. In order to determine this, the juror her-
self would have to testify to its effect, and the prosecution could call
other jurors to affirm or deny the existence of any statements made or
of external pressures placed upon the juror.
A third category would be statements where a juror described the
dynamics or statements of other jurors. Bias and prejudice are most
likely to be revealed in this manner. 231 For example, a juror may say:
"Juror X made a number of racist comments about the defendant;"
"Some of the jurors voting for death were very threatening toward the
two hold-outs for life;" or "Juror Y refused to discuss the mitigating
circumstances." A hearing on the statements would obviously require
the testimony of other jurors, and the judge would have to determine
the credibility of the testimony. If the testimony leaves reasonable
doubt about what happened and its effect on the verdict, then the
death sentence must be vacated.
The fourth category of statements would be a juror's indication
that she voted for death based upon a moral response to the situation.
For example, a juror may explain that she voted for death because the
defendant did not show any remorse, because she was responding to
2" Phillips, 455 U.S. at 219 (stating that claims of juror bias and misconduct are subject
to harmless error analysis); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (establishing
the harmless error standard of review for errors of constitutional magnitude).
231
 Because racism is the factor least likely to be revealed through juror questioning,
McCloskey v. Kemp•type statistics should be enough to raise a reasonable doubt that the ver-
dict was based upon improper considerations of race.
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the power and pain of the victim impact statement, 232 or because she
simply thought the defendant was a bad man. These responses go to
the heart of the debate over our ability to control the moment of the
decision to impose a death sentence. We ask the jurors to act as the
"conscience of the community" and we desire a "reasoned moral re-
sponse."233 However, before reaching this point of discretion, a juror
must have seriously considered aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances and reached the decision that the defendant was death-eligible,
The guided discretion schemes, while not sufficient, are necessary. Af-
ter that point, a decision to impose death may be discretionary, but it
does require a reasoned moral response. 234 That response need not be
terribly articulate and it need not mimic the aggravating factors, but it
cannot be arbitrary. Therefore, as long as the jurors followed the statu-
tory guidelines first, reasons such as those in the statements described
above are unlikely to undermine the verdict.
Far from being unimaginable, the proposal here is a familiar proc-
ess. Courts already hear juror testimony on claims of extraneous
influences on the jury's verdict, and courts already engage in hearings
on new evidence during habeas corpus proceedings. With very little
cost to the system, claims of arbitrariness can be litigated post-trial.
Rather than guessing as to the effect of the arbitrary factor, courts
would now be able to turn to the best evidence—the juror's own state-
ments. Although the reliability of those statements is still a matter for
the court to resolve, the court will, for the first time, have competent
evidence before it about how the death sentence was determined.
CONCLUSION
For almost thirty years, the Supreme Court has been monitoring
capital punishment through a system of risk management. States
232 Although the Court has decided otherwise in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827
(1991), some have argued that victim impact testimony is an arbitrary factor. See, e.g., Jef-
frey Abramson, Death-is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital fury, 2 Onto ST. J.
CRIM. L. 117, 134 (2004) ("Any message that weighing of the relative value of lives is ger-
mane to the penalty decision is especially alarming in light of statistical studies showing
that a victim's high socio-economic status seems to touch off an 'invisible bias' in sentenc-
ing authorities . „ .").
233 Indeed, this is why, in capital cases, juries, and not judges, may be the preferred sen-
tencers. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 619--15 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that
jurors are better situated to express or represent the moral sensibilities of the community).
"4 See Spaziano t Florida, 968 U.S. 447, 481 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[I]n the final analysis, capital punishment rests on not a legal but an
ethical judgment—an assessment of ... the 'moral guilt' of the defendant.").
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adopted guided discretion statutes on the direction from the Court that,
as long as they put in place procedures designed to reduce a substantial
risk of arbitrary imposition of death, then the Eighth Amendment was
satisfied. According to the Court, it is of no constitutional moment
whether these procedures actually work. This Article has demonstrated
that Furman v. Gangia's mandate is absolute: the Eighth Amendment
commands a nonarbitrary outcome when inflicting the gravest punish-
ment known to civilized society. 233
We need to move from procedures that shield arbitrariness to those
that expose it. The only procedure that comes close to enforcing the
substantive right to a nonarbitrary verdict is review of the jurors' reasons
for imposing death. It is no longer sufficient to raise the flag of jury se-
crecy against such procedures. Post-trial practices enforcing jury secrecy
are difficult to justify in capital cases. Although there are practical hur-
dles to realizing the goal of jury transparency, they are not insurmount-
able. It requires no imagination or effort from courts to abolish the no-
impeachment rule in capital cases and hold post-trial hearings.
Perhaps abolition of the capital punishment system is the only tol-
erable solution to its fallibilities." 6
 However, abolition is not imminent.
In the meantime, human beings face death in the darkness of igno-
rance. They, and we, deserve to know; and the Constitution demands
knowing, whether they await death because of any prejudice, error, or
caprice operating among the jurors charged with the awesome respon-
sibility of deciding if they will live or die. Viewing, and reviewing, the
capital jurors' reasons for imposing death shines light into that dark
space.237
235 See 408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972).
238
 For example, both racism and innocence present uniquely intractable problems that
call for an end of capital punishment. See Howe, supra note 102, at 2145-49, 2165-66 (arguing
that racial discrimination in the death penalty is impossible to eliminate and violates the Eighth
Amendment); Radin, suprn note 74, at 1184 (Ile issue is really whether we can accord due
respect to any defendant sentenced to death in the context of a system that we know must
wrongly kill some of them although we do not know which." (citation omitted)); Richard A
Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 106 (2003) (arguing that preventing the execu-
tion of innocents is impossible and therefore capital punishment is unconstitutional).
237
 See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative "Reform" of
the Death Penalty!, 63 OHIO ST. U. 417, 427-28 (2002) (questioning the propriety of reform
while advocating as a "non-entrenching" reform, "sunshine reform, or more simply, data collec-
tion and dissemination," such as the collection of prosecutors' reasons for bringing or declining
to bring a capital case).
